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This dissertation focuses on the theoretical and empirical analysis of individuals’ career
and wage dynamics inside firms. It addresses three areas of interests in this field: human
capital accumulation, signaling, and organization’s structural change.
The first chapter adopts a task-specific human capital perspective to examine the
relationship between individuals’ horizontal (i.e. lateral movements) and vertical (i.e.
promotions) career mobility in a symmetric learning environment. It extends the theo-
retical literature on individuals’ vertical career mobility by incorporating lateral moves
in a standard job assignment model with task-specific human capital accumulation. The
main intuition is that, when upper-level jobs require a wider set of task skills compared
to lower level jobs, firms use lateral moves to develop their employees’ task-specific
human capital before promoting them. Consequently, lateral moves are positively corre-
lated with individuals’ career progressions. This model predicts that individuals who are
laterally moved are more likely to be promoted and to experience larger wage growth
compared to individuals who do not move. Further, individuals with very high levels
of education are less likely to be laterally moved compared to individuals with lower
education levels. These predictions are tested using a large employer-employee linked
panel on over 30,000 senior managers in more than 500 of the largest U.S. firms during
the period of 1981-1985. The empirical evidence supports the theoretical predictions
and shows the importance of lateral mobility in individuals’ career and wage dynamics.
The second chapter addresses the signaling role of not being promoted and how in-
dividuals’ wage-profiles are affected by those signals. There is an extensive body of lit-
erature concerning the positive signals associated with promotion. However, theoretical
investigations of negative signals associated with non-promotion are nearly nonexistent.
In this chapter, a model with asymmetric learning is constructed to capture the negative
signals associated with non-promotion. The model shows that, when productivity rises
little with additional years on the same job level, the negative signal associated with
non-promotion leads to wage decreases. On the other hand, a non-promoted worker’s
wage increases with additional job-level tenure when additional job-level tenure leads
to a sizable increase in productivity. Furthermore, individuals who are promoted when
human capital rises little from the previous period earn a lower promotion wage than
those who are promoted in a previous period. These predictions are tested using the in-
ternal personnel records from a large US firm from 1970-1988. The results support the
model’s predictions to a large extent. In particular, there is a clear hump-shaped pattern
in the wage-job-level-tenure profile for workers who stay in the same job level. This
result suggests that, besides determining workers’ levels of human capital, job tenure
carries rich information about individuals’ unobserved ability. The trade-off between
negative learning and positive human capital accumulation associated with additional
tenure shapes the wage-tenure profile.
The third chapter examine the impact of organizational changes on wages and the
wage distribution inside firms. Over the past twenty years, firms became flatter. There
is an extensive literature - both theoretical and empirical - that explores the causes of
this delayering trend. The consequences of this trend, on the other hand, are not suffi-
ciently studied. This paper examines how wages and the wage distribution change with
firm delayering. A job-assignment model with asymmetric information and a slot con-
straint is considered. The model predicts that more efficient firms are not necessarily
larger than less efficient firms if firms are allowed to adjust their internal organizational
structure through delayering. After delayering, wages at all levels increase and the wage
distribution becomes more unequal. These predictions match a set of empirical findings
in recent studies that are not well explained by existing theories.
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CHAPTER 1
LATERAL MOVES, PROMOTIONS, AND TASK-SPECIFIC HUMAN
CAPITAL: THEORY AND EVIDENCE
1.1 Introduction
Most studies on career and wage dynamics inside firms focus on individuals’ career
movements across different job levels, i.e. promotions (Rosen, 1982; Bernhardt, 1995;
Gibbons and Waldman, 1999a). However, empirical and anecdotal evidence suggest
that lateral career moves, i.e. individuals’ career movements between jobs at the same
job level, are very common. For example, Saari et al. (1988) survey 1,000 randomly
selected firms in the United States and find that over 40% of the organizations use hori-
zontal moves in their human resource practices. A more prominent example comes from
General Electric’s most recent succession saga. By the time Jack Welch left the office
in 2001, the GE Empire had 12 line departments under the Corporate Executive Office.
The current Chairman and CEO, Jeffrey Immelt, served leadership roles in GE Medical,
Plastics, and Appliances before becoming the CEO.
These examples show not only that lateral moves are very common but also there
is an important link between individuals’ lateral moves and promotions. In this essay,
I explore how workers’ lateral moves relate to their promotions, wage dynamics, and
education. To address these questions, I incorporate lateral moves into a job assign-
ment model with task-specific human capital accumulation. The idea of task-specific
human capital was first proposed in Gibbons and Waldman (2004). They emphasize
that workers’ human capital is attached to their jobs. For example, the head of mar-
keting has extensive knowledge about advertisement and consumer behavior, while the
head of logistics is an expert on supplier behavior. However, the two managers may
1
have little knowledge about the other’s arena although they work in the same firm. That
is, employees’ knowledge and skills are attached to their jobs and daily routines. This
study explores how these task-specific skills play a role in workers’ career development.
The main argument is that lateral moves help workers to acquire different types of task-
specific human capital so that they are more productive when they are promoted. From
the theoretical model, I derive a set of predictions regarding the relationship between
lateral moves and individuals’ career outcomes. I test my model’s predictions using a
large employer-employee linked panel dataset of U.S. managers and I find empirical
support for the model predictions.1
To model lateral moves, I consider two job levels in hierarchical firms. There is one
job on the upper level (e.g., the Chief Operating Officers) that oversees two lower level
jobs (e.g., division managers in marketing and logistics). I allow lateral moves between
the two lower level jobs as well as vertical moves across hierarchical levels. The upper-
level job uses the task-skills from both of the lower level jobs (e.g., the COO uses both
marketing and logistic skills).2 Those task-skills can be acquired through working in
different jobs on the lower level or through formal education. The accumulation of
human capital is task-specific and follows diminishing marginal returns to task-tenure
in each job.
The market is competitive with free entry. Individuals differ in terms of their innate
1Although I provide examples and use data on corporate managers in this study, the lateral-move set
up is very general. For example, lateral moves help a cuisine apprentice to become a top chef (Gergaud
et. al., 2012).
2Surveys and studies that support the assumption that the upper level jobs use a wider set of skills
than the lower level jobs are numerous. For example, according to the Occupational Information Network
(O*NET), one of the most comprehensive surveys of occupation and job characteristics in the United
States, there are 17 core tasks for Chief Executives while there are only five core tasks for Financial
Managers at the branch or department level. Mintzberg (1973) in an earlier study shows that managers are
presumed to perform a variety of different tasks, while London (1985) argues that horizontal movements
are effective to develop managers into “generalists”. Ferreira and Sah (2012) provide a rationale for a
wider skill set on the upper level. They argue that, because “generalists” can facilitate communication
among “specialists”, an increasing breadth of expertise with ranks minimizes communication costs.
2
abilities and their education. An individual’s education has two components: a general
education level (i.e., years of schooling) and an education type (i.e., majors). When an
individual enters the labor market, firms (as well as workers) observe her education level
and type but not her innate ability. Firms gradually learn about the individual’s innate
ability by observing her outputs. The output realization is publicly observable. I further
assume that, in the production process, ability and human capital are complementary
while education and employment are substitutes.3
The firms’ problem is to assign workers to jobs optimally so that workers’ total
expected outputs are maximized. Because the market is competitive, workers’ wages
are equal to their expected productivity. Therefore, workers have the incentive to accept
the job assignment because their total expected wages are maximized when the expected
outputs are maximized.
The main trade-off behind the model is the benefit and cost of lateral moves. To
see the logic, let us consider the COO and the two division managers in marketing
and logistics as an example. Since both marketing and logistics are useful to the COO
position, a manager is better off as a COO if she is somewhat knowledgeable about
both marketing and logistics. The benefit of lateral moves lies in the fact that the upper-
level jobs need a wider but not necessarily deep set of skills. However, not everybody is
laterally moved because lateral moves are costly in terms of current productivity because
of task-specific human capital. The core idea of task-specific human capital is that
individuals cannot fully utilize the skills that she acquires in one job on another. The
cost of lateral move is the opportunity cost to the firm and to the worker in terms of
3Numerous empirical studies find complementarity between ability and human capital. For example,
Bartel and Sicherman (1998) report a positive relationship between training and AFQT scores using the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) find a similar pattern in German
data. In addition, all of my results hold if ability and human capital are not complementary. The assump-
tion that education and employment are substitutes simplifies the model, but none of the results rely on
this assumption.
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giving up her old skills and to learn new skills in the current period. So, only those
individuals who show potential for the COO position are laterally moved. Furthermore,
since education and employment are substitutes, when the individual has sufficiently
high levels of general education, she does not need to be laterally moved to diversify her
skill set because she already has all the skills she needs for the COO position.
My model generates three testable predictions. First, laterally moved individuals
are more likely to be promoted compared to individuals who do not move because they
have higher expected innate ability and they can reach a higher human capital level
upon promotion. Second, laterally moved individuals experience larger wage growth
after the moves. Third, the individuals with very high levels of education are less likely
to be laterally moved compared to individuals with lower education levels due to the
substitution between education and on-the-job human capital development.
To test the model’s predictions, I use a unique employer-employee linked panel of
over 30,000 senior managers in more than 500 of the largest U.S. firms from 1981 to
1985. Since the seminal work of Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994a;b), most of the
empirical studies on career and wage dynamics, especially the studies that focus on
U.S. firms, use a single firm’s personnel records.4 Multi-firm analyses in this area pri-
marily rely on European data (e.g., Devereux et al., 2013; Frederiksen and Kato, 2011).
My study uses a multi-firm dataset from the U.S. and generates empirical findings that
support my model’s predictions. I find positive relationships between lateral moves
and promotions and wage growth especially two years after the move, and a negative
relationship between lateral moves and years of schooling for more than 19 years of
schooling.
This study contributes to the literature in multiple ways. First, it extends the theo-
4See Hendricks and Gibbs (2004) for an excellent survey.
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retical literature on career and wage dynamics inside firms by formalizing the relation-
ship between workers’ lateral moves and subsequent promotions.5 Second, this study
contributes to the human capital literature by exploring the role of task-specific human
capital on individuals’ career development. It also adds to the discussion on the ex-
tent to which formal education and employment are substitutes in individuals’ human
capital development. Furthermore, this study enriches the empirical literature on career
and wage dynamics by providing empirical evidence on a set of new testable implica-
tions regarding the relationship between lateral moves and promotions, wage growth,
and education using a multi-firm dataset on senior managers in large U.S. corporations.
The outline of the essay is as follows. In Section 2, I review the related literature.
Section 3 contains the analysis of a three-period model under full information and a
model with symmetric learning. In Section 4, I test the model’s predictions and discuss
the empirical findings. I discuss alternative explanations in Section 5. Section 6 provides
concluding remarks with a discussion of some possible extensions of this study.
1.2 Related Literature
Most of the theoretical literature on individuals’ career dynamics inside firms focuses
on how individuals move along the job ladder vertically. Two of the building-block the-
oretical models concerning (vertical) career movements are the tournament model (e.g.,
Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Rosen, 1986) and the job assignment model (e.g., Gibbons and
Waldman, 1999a). Both types of models assume only one type of job at each level, and
lateral moves are not considered.
5Gibbons and Waldman (2004) touched on this relationship very briefly. Conaty and Charan’ in their
2010 New York Time’s Bestseller book, Talent Matters, has some discussion about using job rotation as a
training device. This study formalizes and extends their observations and make the underlying mechanism
transparent.
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A few studies have considered two specific types of horizontal movements: job rota-
tion and horizontal transfers that include promotions. The first type of horizontal move
is job rotation. Job rotation is a special type of lateral move in which each trainee in the
job rotation program follows a predetermined career path by changing positions within
the same job level (e.g., medical or management trainees in their training period usu-
ally rotate around different departments). Ortega (2001) considers a model where job
rotation facilitates the firms’ learning about their workers’ ability match with differ-
ent jobs. Building on Ortega’s idea, Li and Tian (2013) investigate a directed search
model where job rotation improves the match between workers and jobs and thus leads
to higher wages and lower turnover rates in larger firms. However, neither of these two
job-rotation models makes predictions regarding the relation between horizontal moves
and individuals’ career progressions.
The other type of horizontal movement investigated in the literature is horizontal
transfers that include promotions (Kusunoki and Numagami, 1998; Ariga, 2006; Sasaki
et. al., 2012). Horizontal transfers defined in those studies differ from lateral moves that
defined here because those transfers are not restricted to movements within the same job
level. One prediction from this literature is that a current period transfer is more likely
to happen with a current period promotion, i.e., workers are transferred when they are
promoted (Sasaki et. al., 2012). However, these models do not make predictions about
current transfers and subsequent promotions as my model does.6
My study also relates to the human capital literature. In particular, I adopt the
task-specific human capital approach developed in Gibbons and Waldman (2004; 2006)
rather than the traditional Beckerian dichotomy of general and firm-specific human cap-
6Friebel and Raith (2013) also consider a model with cross-divisional transfers. The focus of their
paper is on the agency problem and job assignment efficiency under contract arrangements with and
without horizontal transfers. They show that the contract with horizontal transfers dominates the contract
without when managers have private informationn about their workers in their own division and when the
division profit is more sensitive to division output (thus correct job assignment is more important).
6
ital (Becker, 1962;1964).7 There is substantial evidence that supports the importance of
task-specific human capital in workers’ wage dynamics. Using German data, Gathmann
and Schonberg (2010) empirically quantify the significant contribution of task-specific
human capital to wage growth. They find that task-specific human capital accounts for
22% to 52% of individuals’ overall wage growth. Using a sample of 1% of the British
workforce, Devereux et al. (2013) find that a large proportion of the return-to-tenure
arises with job-level tenure within firms rather than firm-level tenure. Using data from
76 firms in the U.S. Information Technology industry, Schulz et al. (2013) show that
task-specific human capital (measured as job-tenure) is positively associated with em-
ployee compensation. My study goes one step further by exploring the way in which
task-specific human capital is acquired through lateral moves.8
There are two studies on lateral moves that are closely related to my analysis. Git-
tings (2012) uses the same data set that I use and shows that individuals who are laterally
moved have higher wages in the period of the lateral move. However, he does not pro-
vide a theoretical explanation for this empirical finding. Clemens (2012) develops a
theoretical prediction that lateral transfers into a fast job is positively correlated with
subsequent promotions but transfers into a slow job is negatively correlated with sub-
sequent promotions.9 However, using a single firm’s personnel records, Clemens finds
that lateral transfers into either fast or slow jobs are positively correlated with subsequent
promotions. That is, he does not find empirical support for his model’s prediction but
7Other studies using Gibbons and Waldman’s (2004;2006) framework concerning task-specific human
capital accumulation include Balmaceda (2006) and Clemens (2012). Balmaceda (2006) applies the task-
framework to consider optimal job designs. Clemens’ (2012) analysis is closely related to my essay and
is discussed further below.
8The idea that human capital is attached to jobs is also closely related to the occupational-specific
human capital (Kambourov, et al., 2009) and industry-specific human capital (Parent, 2000) approaches.
Both approaches find supporting evidence that human capital does not accumulate homogeneously and
occupational and industry-specific human capital are more pertinent to wage profiles rather than firm-
specific human capital.
9Clemens defines fast jobs as those positions in a firm out of which promotions are more likely com-
pared to other positions at the same hierarchical level. The ”other” positions with a lower rate of promo-
tion are referred to as slow jobs.
7
provides some evidence that is consistent with my model’s prediction regarding lateral
moves.
In summary, this study extends the theory on job-assignment and the literature on
human capital development. It also enriches the empirical studies on lateral moves by
providing a theoretical framework and a set of new testable implications.
1.3 Theoretical Analysis
In this section, I set up a three-period two-level model to capture lateral moves and
career progression. The production technology is closely related to those analyzed in
Gibbons and Waldman (2006). I first consider a model with full information. I then
develop a model with symmetric learning and derive testable implications.
1.3.1 The modeling environment
There is free entry into production. All firms are identical and labor is the only input.
Workers and firms are risk-neutral and they do not discount the future. Workers bear no
cost to change firms and firms bear no cost to hire or fire workers. Workers and firms
enter into the employment relation through spot-market contracting.
Each firm consists of two hierarchical levels. There are two jobs on level 1, de-
noted by j, j ∈ {A,B}, and only one job on level 2. Workers’ careers last for three
periods, denoted by t ∈ {1,2,3}. Workers can move laterally between lower level jobs
and vertically across job levels. Workers in period t have t−1 periods of labor market
experience, which is equal to the sum of job tenure in each job at each level.
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Worker i enters the labor market in period 1 with a general education level si, where
si takes integer values from 1 through N, i.e. si ∈ {1, . . .N}. Workers also differ by
their education types. There are two education types: type A and type B. There are 2 ·m
workers in each education level and half of them have type-A education.10 Within each
education type at each education level, workers’ innate abilities are random draws from
a common distribution such that a worker has high innate ability θH with probability p0,
and low innate ability θL with probability 1− p0.11
A particular education type gives a worker α units of match quality in the corre-
sponding job type. Let αi j denote worker i’s match with job j. If worker i has type-A ed-
ucation, then αiA =α,αiB = 0. If worker i has type-B education, then αiA = 0,αiB =α .12
The education type can be understood as a worker’s major or curriculum focus in school
that makes her a better fit with one job or the other. A worker with type- j education is
referred to as a type- j worker. Job j is referred to as type- j workers’ matched job. Like
education levels, individuals’ education types are fully observable to all labor market
participants. I further assume that if a worker is not assigned to her matched job in her
first employment period, the match quality depreciates and only λα(λ ∈ [0,1]) is ap-
plicable in the next period. In addition, this match quality is not directly applicable to
the level-2 job. If a worker has never worked in her matched job on the lower level, she
cannot apply this match on the upper-level job.
Let x˜i jt = xi jt +αi j denote worker i’s effective job-specific task-tenure in job j on
level 1 in period t, where xi jt is worker i’s tenure in job j on level 1 prior to t and αi j is
10The proportion of type-A education is not essential for the result.
11Note that in this set up, workers’ education levels are not affected by their innate abilities. Alterna-
tively, I can assume that there are more high ability workers in the high education groups than in the low
education groups. But this assumption would not change any of the results concerning lateral moves and
promotions.
12To keep the model tractable, I assume a perfect match between education types and job types. I also
assume a constant match quality. By doing so, I abstract away the effect of lateral moves on improving
workers’ matches with jobs and focus on the human capital development effects from lateral moves.
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worker i’s match with job j. xi2t is worker i’s tenure on level 2 prior to t. The job experi-
ence, education level and match quality add to workers’ stock of human capital. Greater
experience, higher education level, and a better match of education types to jobs make
a worker more productive. I consider the set-up where schooling and job experience
are substitutes (Mincer, 1958;1962) while ability and human capital are complements
(Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998). The production technology in job j on level 1 is
yi jt = d1+ c1[θi f (x˜i jt + si)+ εi jt ], j ∈ {A,B}. (1.1)
f (·) captures individuals’ human capital accumulation.θi f ′(·) is the speed with
which human capital grows in period t. Following Acemoglu and Pischke (1998), I
assume that f (·) is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and concave
with f (0)> 0. I also assume that limτ→τ¯ f
′
(τ) = 0 for some 0 < τ¯ < N, where N is the
highest level of general schooling. This restriction says that a worker cannot learn more
from work after she spends sufficient amount of time on the job or if she has a very high
level of general schooling (such as a Ph.D).
In my model, human capital acquisition is task-specific in two ways. First, the task-
skills acquired in one of the lower level jobs are not applicable to the other job. Second,
a proportion (1−γ, 0≤ γ ≤ 1) of the task-skills are lost when a worker is promoted from
the lower level jobs to the upper-level job. Formally, for workers with x˜iAt effective task-
tenure from job A, x˜iBt effective task-tenure from job B, and xi2t task-tenure from level
2, her output in the level-2 job in period t is
yi2t = d2+ c2 {θi[ f (xi2t + γ x˜iAt + si)+ f (xi2t + γ x˜iBt + si)]+ εi2t} ,γ ∈ [0,1]. (1.2)
Equation (1.2) tells us that the upper-level job uses task-skills from both jobs on the
lower level. Given the concavity in f (·), having extensive experience in one of the lower
level jobs provides little incremental total human capital as opposed to having a more
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balanced skill set in both jobs.13 I assume the general education level is fully applicable
to all jobs across levels (as opposed to the special component of a worker’s education,
αi j, which is only applicable to the matched job). I further assume that none of the
task-tenure on the upper-level job can be applied to the lower level jobs. When a worker
is demoted, she loses all the task-tenure on level 2.
dL and cL, L ∈ {1,2}, are production constants known to all labor-market partic-
ipants. I assume that d1 > d2 and c1 < c2, which means output increases faster with
ability in the upper level job (Rosen,1982 ; Waldman, 1984a). εi jt and εi2t are noise
terms drawn from a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance σ2ε .
I focus on Bayes-Nash Equilibria. The timing of the events in the economy is the
following. At the beginning of period 1, firms observe an individual’s education level
and education type but not her ability type. Firms make job assignment decisions and
wage offers based on the individual’s expected abilities, education levels and education
types. The individual then chooses the firm that offers the highest wage to work at. At
the end of period 1, all firms observe each worker’s output and update beliefs about
abilities. At the beginning of period 2, firms make job assignment decisions and wage
offers based on workers’ expected abilities, education levels and education types. Firms
can either promote a worker to level 2, move a worker to a different job, or let her stay
in the same position. Workers then choose the firm that offers the highest wage to work
at. If multiple firms offer the same highest wage, a worker randomly chooses among
those firms but stays with her period-1 employer if the period-1 employer is one of the
highest-wage-offer firms. Production begins. At the end of period 2, workers’ outputs
are observed. This process is repeated in period 3.
13Also note that the human capital accumulation functions on level 1 and level 2 do not have to be the
same. I assume they are the same to simplify the parameter restrictions.
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1.3.2 Analysis and Testable Implications
In this subsection I start by describing equilibrium behavior in a benchmark model
where individuals’ abilities are fully observable. I then consider a model with sym-
metric learning.
When task-specific human capital accumulation is assumed, strategic firms do not
simply maximize current productivity since current job assignment decisions (i.e., pro-
motions and lateral moves) affect future human capital development. Instead, firms
choose the optimal career development path in a given period that maximizes workers’
total expected productivity over the remaining periods. In addition, firms make zero
expected profits in equilibrium in each period due to free entry and the absence of firm-
specific human capital. Since there is no firm-specific human capital, workers’ wages
are equal to their expected productivity in each period.
Equilibrium with Full Information
I start the analysis by considering all possible career paths under full information. To
reduce the number of cases, I focus on parameterizations for which the most able worker
with the highest education level is not assigned to level-2 in period 1.14 Furthermore, I
focus on the parameterization such that if a worker is not assigned to her matched job
in the first period, a substantial amount of the match quality is lost.15 Under these two
restrictions, a worker is always assigned to the job that matches with her education type
(or major) when she first enters the labor market. In period 2, a worker can be promoted,
laterally moved or held in the same position. In period 3, since a demoted worker loses
14The parameter restriction that guarantees this is given in the Appendix.
15Recall that if a type- j worker is not assigned to job- j in her first employment period, only λα of the
match quality is applicable in the next period. Here I focus on the equilibrium where λ is sufficiently
small.
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all her task-tenure on the upper level, it is not efficient to first promote then demote a
worker. Also, under full information, firms have no incentive to laterally move a worker
in period 2 but not promote her in period 3.
Based on the above analysis, there are four potential equilibrium paths: starting in
their matched job in period 1, workers can be (i) promoted in period 2 and stay on level
2 in period 3; (ii) held in their matched jobs in period 2 and promoted in period 3; (iii)
laterally moved in period 2 and promoted in period 3; (iv) stay in their matched jobs for
all three periods. Since all workers are assigned to their matched jobs in period 1, I only
need to consider the optimal output from period 2’s perspective. It can be shown that for
all positive values of ability types, either career path (ii) dominates career path (iii) or
verse visa. When stay-promote (career path (ii)) dominates lateral-move-promote (ca-
reer path (iii)), there are no lateral moves in equilibrium. I refer to parameterizations
that yield this equilibrium outcome as the non-lateral-move regime. Similarly, when
lateral-move-promote (career path (iii)) dominates stay-promote (career path (ii)), lat-
eral moves exist in equilibrium. I refer to parameterizations that yield this equilibrium
outcome as the lateral-move regime. The parameterizations that sustain the lateral-move
regime satisfy equation (1.3).
c2[ f (γ+γα+s)+ f (γ+s)− f (2γ+γα+s)− f (s)]> c1[ f (1+α+s)− f (s)],s< τ¯ <N
(1.3)
Condition (1.3) guarantees that, given a low education level s, lateral moves lead to
a larger gain in human capital upon promotion (LHS) than what is lost upon moving
(RHS).
In the lateral-move regime, the very high ability workers are promoted in period 2.
If a worker is not good enough for an immediate promotion, she is laterally moved in
preparation for a promotion in period 3. Proposition 1 summarizes equilibrium behavior
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in the lateral-move regime. Let wit denote the wage paid to worker i in period t. All
proofs are given in the Appendix.
Proposition 1. (full-information model) If each worker’s innate ability is fully observ-
able and equation (1.3) is satisfied, then there exist two critical values, θ˜ ∗ and θ ∗,
θ˜ ∗ < θ ∗, such that job assignment rules and wages are given by (i) through (iv):
(i) If θi > θ ∗, then worker i is promoted to level 2 in period 2 and wi2 = d2 +
c2θi[ f (γ + γα + s) + f (s)]. This worker remains on level 2 in period 3 and wi3 =
d2+ c2θi[ f (1+ γ+ γα+ s)+ f (1+ s)].
(ii) If θ˜ ∗ < θi ≤ θ ∗, then worker i is laterally moved in period 2 and wi2 = d1 +
c1θi f (s). This worker will be assigned to level 2 in period 3 and wi3 = d2+ c2θi[ f (γ+
γα+ s)+ f (γ+ s)].
(iii) If θi ≤ θ˜ ∗, then worker i remains in her matched job in periods 2 and 3 with
wi2 = d1+ c1θi f (1+α+ s) and wi3 = d1+ c1θi f (2+α+ s).
(iv) In period 1, all workers are assigned to their matched jobs on level 1 and wi1 =
d1+ c1θi f (α+ s).
Now consider how lateral moves are related to promotions and wage changes in
the lateral-move regime. Proposition 1 indicates that, under full information, a worker
is promoted in period 3 if and only if she is laterally moved in period 2 (given she
is not promoted in period 2). The reason is that, with perfect information, firms have
no incentive to incur the cost to move a worker if they do not expect to promote this
worker, since the gain of a lateral move is only realized upon promotion. Thus, under
full information, lateral moves in period 2 predict promotion in period 3 with probability
1.
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With regard to wage changes, workers who are laterally moved have larger wage
growth in period 3 relative to workers who are not moved (and are not promoted in
period 2). Two forces lead to this result. First, laterally moved workers have higher
innate abilities than non-movers. Second, lateral moves lead to a larger increase in
human capital upon promotion. To understand the logic, note that the increase in human
capital for the non-movers comes from one additional period of tenure in her matched
job on level 1. The increase in human capital for the movers comes from the difference
between the human capital level she achieves on level 2 and the human capital level in
her non-matched job on level 1. Since the movers achieve a higher human capital level
after the move but their human capital level in the period of lateral moves is lower than
the non-movers, the movers have a larger human capital growth compared to the non-
movers. Consequently, laterally moved workers experience a larger wage growth than
non-movers in periods after the move.16
Now consider how education affects the equilibrium. Let us first consider the equi-
librium when the general education level is sufficiently high, in particular when si ≥ τ¯
(recall that limτ→τ¯ f
′
(τ) = 0 for some 0 < τ¯ < ∞). In this case, a worker is almost
equally competent in both jobs and she can learn very little from the other job through
a lateral move. Thus, the worker enters into the non-lateral move regime, i.e., equation
(1.3) is not satisfied. In period 2, she is either promoted or stays in her incumbent job
for one more period before promotion in period 3. Compared to a worker whose general
education is not that high (i.e., si < τ¯) so she can reach a higher human capital level
from a lateral move (i.e., equation (1.3) is satisfied), the worker with a high education
16In the current set up, a laterally moved worker has a wage decrease in the period of the lateral
move under full information. This is because I only consider on-the-job task-specific human capital
accumulation in the model. If general human capital is included, a laterally moved worker may have a
wage increase in the period of the lateral move. In addition, if general human capital is complementary
to workers’ innate abilities, the mover may have a larger wage growth than a non-mover in the period of
the lateral move even though there is a task-specific human captial loss to the mover. I will come back to
this point when I discuss the model with symmetric learning.
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level is less likely to be laterally moved.
Next, consider the equilibrium when the general education level is not high enough
to fully substitute for the human capital gain from lateral moves (i.e. si < τ¯) and the
return to lateral moves is high upon promotion (i.e., equation (1.3) is satisfied). In this
regime, the net benefit of being laterally moved increases with the general education
level when the upper-level job is substantially different from the lower level jobs (i.e.
c2  c1). This is because the net benefit from moving a higher-education worker is
higher than that of moving a lower-education worker. However, when the upper-level
job is not substantially different from the lower level jobs, even in the lateral move
regime, individuals with more education can be less likely to be laterally moved due to
the substitution between education and task-tenure.
Equilibrium with Symmetric Learning
The full-information model carries most of the insights regarding how lateral moves
affect promotion probabilities, but the prediction that lateral moves predict promotions
perfectly is not realistic. In this subsection, I consider equilibrium behavior with sym-
metric learning. For tractability, I focus on parameterizations that satisfy (1.3) in the
main part of the analysis and relax this restriction when I consider the relationship be-
tween education and lateral moves.
With symmetric learning, all firms have the same information about a worker’s in-
nate ability. Define the information that each firm gets in period t as zit = (yi jt−dl)/cl .
Let θ eit denote the expected ability in period t conditional on the information. That is,
θ eit = E(θ |zt) where zt = {zt−1,zt−2, . . . ,z1} is the full history of information.
I consider the job assignment problem with symmetric learning by backward in-
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duction. In period 3, since it is the last period, if a worker is not promoted, it is op-
timal to assign the worker to her matched job. That is, if workers are not promoted
in period 3, a type-A worker will be assigned to job A while a type-B worker will be
assigned to job B, regardless of their assignments in period 2. Also, since period 3
is the last period, job assignments in period 3 are free of investment concerns. Thus,
the equilibrium job assignments maximize period 3’s productivity. Let θ jk3 and θ
j j
3
denote, respectively, the cutoff ability levels for promotion in period 3 for a period-2
mover and a period-2 non-mover (a non-mover is not promoted or moved). θ jk3 solves
d1 + c1θ
jk
3 f (1+α + s) = d2 + c2θ
jk
3 [ f (γ + γα + s) + f (γ + 1+ s)], while θ
j j
3 solves
d1+ c1θ
j j
3 f (2+α+ s) = d2+ c2θ
j j
3 [ f (2γ+ γα+ s)+ f (s)]. Let θ
j2
3 denote the cutoff
ability level for a period-2 promoted worker to stay on level 2 in period 3. θ j23 solves
d1+ c1θ
j2
3 f (1+α+ s) = d2+ c2θ
j2
3 [ f (1+ γ+ γα+ s)+ f (1+ s)].
In period 2, firms choose job assignments to maximize workers’ total expected
outputs in periods 2 and 3. Let θ j2 denote the cutoff ability level for promotions in
period 2. θ j2 solves d1 + c1θ
j
2 f (s) + E(yi3|θ ei2 ≤ θ j2 ) = d2 + c2θ j2 [ f (γ + γα + s) +
f (s)] +E(yi3|θ ei2 > θ j2 ). E(yi3|·) is the expected output in the next period given this
period’s expected ability and job assignment. Let θ˜ j2 denote the cutoff ability level
for lateral moves in period 2. θ˜ j2 solves d1 + c1θ˜
j
2 f (1+α + s) + E(yi3|θ ei2 ≤ θ˜ j2 ) =
d1 + c1θ˜
j
2 f (s)+E(yi3|θ ei2 > θ˜ j2 ). The task-tenure in the incumbent job and the match
quality are unutilized in the period when a worker is moved to a new job.
Similar to the full-information case, the optimal job assignment rules under symmet-
ric learning are characterized by cutoff ability levels. The difference is that, with pro-
duction uncertainties, firms sometimes “make mistakes”. In the full-information case,
only period-2 lateral movers are promoted in period 3. Under symmetric learning, if
a non-mover produces very high output in period 2, she might be promoted in period
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3. On the other hand, if a mover produces very low output, she might be promoted in
period 3. Therefore, there are two types of workers at the beginning of period 3: those
who were laterally moved in period 2 and those who were not laterally moved, and both
of them can be considered for promotions.
Proposition 2 summarizes the above discussion.
Proposition 2. (symmetric learning) Suppose that learning is symmetric and the prior
belief about a worker’s type is that a worker has high innate ability θH with probability
p0 , and low innate ability θL with probability (1− p0). The job assignment rules and
wages are given by (i) through (iv):
(i) In period 3, if worker i’s expected ability θ ei3 > θ
j2
3 , j ∈ {A,B} and she was
promoted in period 2, then she remains on level 2. If worker i’s expected ability
θ ei3 > θ
jk
3 ( or θ
j j
3 ) and she was (or was not) laterally moved in period 2, then she is
assigned to level 2. All non-promoted workers in period 3 are assigned to their matched
jobs on level 1.
(ii) In period 2, if worker i’s expected ability θ ei2 > θ
j
2 , j ∈ {A,B}, then she is pro-
moted to level 2; if θ˜ j2 < θ
e
i2 ≤ θ j2 , then she is laterally moved; if θ ei2 ≤ θ˜ j2 , then she
remains in job- j on level 1.
(iii) In period 1, all workers are assigned to their matched jobs on level 1 and wi1 =
d1+ c1θ¯ f (α+ s), θ¯ = p0θH +(1− p0)θL.
(iv) θ jk3 < θ
j j
3 . The cutoff ability for promotions in period 3 is lower for lateral
movers.
I now derive two testable predictions from the equilibrium described in Proposition
2. The first prediction considers the relationship between lateral moves and expected
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promotion probabilities. As discussed above, lateral moves incur an opportunity cost in
human capital in period 2. However, if a period-2 lateral mover is promoted in period
3, she can achieve a higher human capital level than a non-mover. Since the lateral-
move decisions are endogenous, firms would want to choose a cutoff level such that the
expected probability that a laterally moved worker is promoted in the next period is high
enough to ensure that the expected return from each lateral move exceeds the expected
cost in task-specific human capital upon moving. Thus, from period 2’s perspective, the
probability that a laterally moved worker is promoted in period 3 will be higher than the
probability that a non-mover is promoted. Formally, let X = prob.(θ ei3 > θ
jk
3 |θ˜ j2 < θ ei2 ≤
θ j2 ) denote the probability that a laterally moved worker is promoted in period 3 from
period 2’s perspective. It is the probability that worker i’s expected ability in period
3 conditional on her output history {zi1,zi2} is greater than the promotion threshold
for movers (θ jk3 ), given that worker i is laterally moved in period 2 (θ˜
j
2 < θ
e
i2 ≤ θ j2 ).
Similarly, Y = prob.(θ ei3 > θ
j j
3 |θ ei2 < θ˜ j2 ) is the probability that a non-mover is promoted
in period 3.
Corollary 1. Under symmetric learning, the probability that a period-2 laterally moved
worker is promoted in period 3 is larger than the probability that a period-2 non-
laterally moved worker is promoted in period 3 (given she is not laterally moved and
not promoted in period 2), i.e. X > Y.
The positive relation between lateral moves and subsequent promotions come from
two sources. First, from (iii) in Proposition 2, laterally moved workers have higher
expected ability than non-movers. Second, from (iv), the movers have a lower threshold
to pass in order to get the promotion. That is, the movers are more likely to be promoted
both because they are better workers and because they are on a better path to accumulate
human capital for the upper level job.
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The second testable implication concerns the size of the wage changes in periods
after lateral moves. The symmetric learning model generates similar predictions re-
garding wages as those in the full-information model, i.e., laterally moved workers are
expected to have a larger wage growth in period 3. Let ∆wL and ∆wS denote expected
wage changes (in levels) for lateral movers and non-movers from period 2 to period 3.
Corollary 2. Conditional on prior beliefs about workers’ abilities, laterally moved
workers on average experience a larger wage growth in the period after the move, i.e.
∆wL > ∆wS.
As in the full information model, the positive relationship between wage growth and
lateral move comes from positive learning about a laterally moved worker’s innate abil-
ity and the effect of a lateral move on human capital accumulation. The positive learning
on lateral moves follows exactly the same logic as in the full information model. The re-
lationship between lateral moves and the expected human capital level is the following.
As stated in Corollary 1, lateral moves are associated with a higher promotion probabil-
ity. In addition, a laterally moved worker can achieve a higher human capital level upon
promotion. Thus the mover’s expected human capital level is higher than a non-mover’s
human capital level. Since in equilibrium workers’ wages are equal to their expected
productivity, laterally moved workers are expected to have a larger wage growth. This
positive relationship between lateral moves and wage growth exists even when ability
types are controlled for since lateral moves have a permanent effect on human capital
accumulation.
Now consider wage growth in the period of a lateral move. Under the current set up,
the model makes an ambiguous prediction. The reason is that although lateral movers
have a decrease in their (task-specific) human capital levels in the period of the lateral
move, there is positive learning about the movers’ expected abilities. If the positive
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learning about lateral movers’ abilities outweighs the decrease in human capital, movers
experience a larger wage growth in the period of lateral moves compared to non-movers.
If the decrease in human capital outweighs the positive learning on ability, movers have
a smaller wage growth in the period of lateral moves compared to non-movers.
The third prediction is not directly from Proposition 2. It considers the relationship
between lateral moves and general education levels. As discussed in the full information
case, when the general education level is sufficiently high, workers enter the non-lateral
move regime.17 However, for workers with lower education levels such that the lateral-
move regime is sustained, the probability of lateral move is positive in equilibrium.
Therefore, workers with very high education are less likely to be laterally moved.18 I
summarize this argument in Corollary 3.
Corollary 3. In period 2, among those who are not promoted in the current period,
the probability of being laterally moved decreases with the general education when the
schooling level is sufficiently high.
Now consider the relationship between lateral moves and education levels in the
lateral move regime. It can be shown that if the upper level job is sufficiently different
from the lower level job (i.e., c2  c1), individuals with higher education levels are
more likely to be laterally moved. However, since I cannot measure the difference in
the production functions in the two jobs levels, the empirical prediction regarding the
probability of lateral moves and education levels is ambiguous for workers with low and
medium education levels.
In this section, I incorporate lateral moves into a model with job assignment, human
17This suggests that there are no lateral moves with very high education. I observe this pattern in the
data. I will return to this point in the empirical section.
18Note that, if the match quality (αi j) is very high, it would be too costly to laterally move some-
one. Therefore, there would be no lateral moves in the equilibrium. Empirically, we cannot perfectly
distinguish between the effect from education-tak-tenure substitution and the effect from match cost.
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capital development, and symmetric learning. Since lateral move is a more efficient way
(relative to no lateral moves) to develop human capital for the upper level job, relatively
higher ability workers are selected into this career path. Consequently, lateral moves
are associated with positive career outcomes in terms of promotion probabilities and
wage growth in periods after the move. Furthermore, due to the substitution between
education and human capital development on-the-job, workers with very high levels of
education are less likely to be laterally moved.
1.4 Data and Tests
In this section, I test my model’s predictions using a large employer-employee linked
panel on top American executives. Data on top managers are suitable for this study for
two reasons. First, the nature of the management level jobs matches the assumption that
the upper-level jobs use a wider set of skills than the lower level jobs. For example,
it is important for a top-level executive (such as a Chief Operations Officer) to be fa-
miliar with business operations in different lower-level line departments, but a research
associate in the R&D department might not need task-skills from the Finance depart-
ment. Second, lateral moves (as defined in my essay) are more likely to exist among
senior managers. Campion et al. (1994) find that horizontal movements among upper
level managers bring “broader perspective on other business functions” to the managers,
while young workers are more likely to be involved in job rotation.
In the following subsections, I first describe the data used for this study and how
the sample and measures are constructed. I then test the three predictions derived in the
previous section.
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1.4.1 Data
The data is a large employer-employee linked panel that contains information on over
30,000 executives in over 500 of the largest U.S. firms during the period 1981-1985.19
A unique identifier is assigned to each firm. However, the same individual may have
different identifiers in different firms, which means I cannot track individuals across
firms.
There are three compensation-related variables (in nominal terms): base pay, bonus
pay, and pay midgrade. I deflate them using the Consumer Price Index in 1982 US
dollars provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. I construct the measure of total pay
as the sum of base pay and bonus pay.
Three variables in this dataset define an executive’s position in the firm: reporting
level, organizational unit level, and job code. The reporting level counts the number
of levels away from the Board of Director (the BOD). The CEO directly reports to the
BOD and thus is at reporting-level 1. All executives who directly report to the CEO are
at reporting-level 2, and all executives who directly report to level-2 executives are at
reporting-level 3, etc. The organizational unit level counts the major organizational units
away from the BOD. An organizational unit is a company, group, division, sales region,
or manufacturing facility that the company accounts for as a separate profit center. In
a hypothetical organization where a division manager reports to a group executive who
reports to a corporate executive, the division manager is on Unit Level 3, the group
executive is on Unit Level 2, and the corporate executive is on Unit Level 1. Job codes
19The dataset was constructed by a large consulting firm through annual surveys of those firms. Firms
are paid to participate in the survey. Each firm reports data on about 80 executives per year. The dataset
contains rich information on individual, job and firm characteristics, including: age, years of education,
hiring date, job title, reporting level, unit level, job title, base pay, bonus pay, pay midgrade, firms’
industry, profits, sales, span of control, and employment size. See Abowd (1990), Bognanno(2001),
Belzil and Bognanno (2008), Gittings (2012) and Belzil et al. (2012) for more details about the data and
the data collection procedure.
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are workers’ job titles. There are 11 reporting levels, 8 unit levels, and 165 job codes
(i.e. job titles).
To define job transitions, I use the reporting level as a basic measure. I define pro-
motion as an upward movement in the reporting level (e.g., from level 4 to level 3).
Since executives in different unit levels can share the same job title, I do not restrict
promotions to upward movements with a job title change.20 However, I define demo-
tion as a downward movement in the reporting level with a job title change. As Belzil
et al. (2012) point out, there is an organizational re-structuring through the sampling
years from 1981 to 1985 where a COO position is added between CEO and lower level
executives.21 This organizational change causes a universal downward movement of re-
porting levels without actual demotions or job title changes. Therefore, to qualify for a
demotion in the data, an individual has to move down the reporting level with a job title
change.
Defining lateral moves requires more careful work. Conceptually, a lateral move en-
tails a change of job content without a change in hierarchical position within a firm. Due
to data constraints, I cannot identify lateral moves between different divisions within
the same unit level. Therefore, I define lateral moves as movements within the same re-
porting level with a job title change or a unit-level change. These types of lateral moves
provide executives with the opportunities to acquire different types of task-specific skills
in another job or another business unit.22
Table 1.1 summarizes different types of lateral moves and subsequent promotions
20For example, a transition from the Top Personnel Executive in a profit center to the Top Corporate
Personnel Executive comes with no job title change but is clearly a promotion.
21In a recent study, Caliendo et al. (2013) find in a comprehensive dataset of French manufacturing
firms that firms frequently expand by adding layers (levels).
22As a robustness check, I exclude those lateral moves with a unit level up but without reporting level
changes since this type of movement can be considered as a promotion. The results are consistent with
what I find with the definition of lateral move used in the main part of the analysis.
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Table 1.1: Lateral Moves and Subsequent Promotions by Type of Moves.
Promotion in One Year Promotion in Two Years
No Yes No Yes
Lateral Move
Mover 3,314 533 1,524 250
86.2% 13.9% 85.9% 14.1%
Non-mover 25,681 3,675 12,471 1,752
87.5% 12.5% 87.7% 12.3%
Lateral Move with Unit-level Up
Mover 1,051 151 415 87
87.4% 12.6% 82.7% 17.3%
Non-mover 27,944 4,057 13,580 1,915
87.3% 12.7% 87.6% 12.4%
Lateral Move with Unit-level Down
Mover 888 185 398 81
82.8% 17.2% 83.1% 16.9%
Non-mover 28,107 4,023 13,597 1,921
87.5% 12.5% 87.6% 12.4%
Lateral Move with Unit-level Same
Mover 1,375 197 711 82
87.5% 12.5% 89.7% 10.3%
Non-mover 27,620 4,011 13,284 1,920
87.3% 12.7% 87.4% 12.6%
Note: Sample restricted to executives who are not promoted in the
current period.
one year and two years after the move. Overall, non-promoted executives with any kind
of lateral move are more likely to have a promotion one year or two years after the move
than non-promoted executives without lateral moves. For example, among those who
are laterally moved, 13.9% are promoted one year after the move, while only 12.5% of
the non-movers are promoted one year from the period of lateral moves. The gap in
the promotion probability becomes larger two years after the lateral-move period. In the
second year after the moves, 14.1% of the movers are promoted while 12.3% of the non-
movers are promoted. In the following analysis, I consider any lateral moves within the
same reporting level either with a job-title change or with a unit-level change. I further
restrict the sample to executives who appear in the sample for at least 3 consecutive
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics.
A. Excecutive Characteristics in 1981
No. of Executives in 1981: 12,023
Reporting Firm Job Age Year of
Level Tenure Tenure (median) Schooling
all 15.2 4.2 48.0 16.4
1 22.7 6.8 57.0 17.0
2 16.0 4.3 51.0 17.0
3 14.6 4.1 49.0 16.8
4 14.6 4.1 47.0 16.4
5 15.1 4.0 47.0 16.2
6 16.0 4.1 6.5 15.8
7 18.2 4.5 47.0 15.2
8 17.1 4.3 6.5 15.0
9 20.0 3.8 49.0 15.2
10 16.3 3.0 39.0 13.1
11 22.8 4.0 50.0 14.0
B. Compensation Measures by Sampling Year: 1981-85
Year 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
No. of Exe 12,023 15,749 18,578 15,611 12,190
Total Pay $103,962 $105,680 $104,333 $110,854 $120,743
Base $82,016 $82,982 $85,218 $88,314 $92,626
Bonus $21,945 $22,698 $19,110 $22,540 $28,118
C. Changes in Firm Characteristics and Job Transition Status by Sampling Year
Year 1981-1982 1982-1983 1983-1984 1984-1985
∆%sales 12.6% 3.9% 3.0% 18.5%
∆%profits 15.2% 24.8% -12.3% 27.6%
∆%sizes 2.1% -0.3% 0.9% 7.8%
Promotion 12.4% 13.4% 14.4% 13.8%
Lateral move 10.6% 12.2% 12.1% 23.5%
Demotion 2.4% 2.1% 2.3% 3.4%
Note: Total pay, base pay and bonus pay are in 1982 US dollars
years. This results in a sample of 290 firms, 19,149 executives, and 74,153 executive-
year observations.
Table 1.2 provides summary statistics of the sample to be used in the empirical tests.
Panel A shows the individual characteristics of the 1981 cohort. The median age of the
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executives is 48, which is higher than the median age of the general working population
in the U.S.23 The executives have, on average, 4.2 years of job tenure on the current po-
sition and 15.2 years of firm tenure since the first hire. The average years-of-education is
16.4. Most of the executives are in reporting levels 1 through 8. The average firm tenure
for a CEO position (reporting level 1) is 23 years. Panel B summarizes different com-
pensation measures for executives from 1981 to 1985. The total number of executives
in the sample varies across years. Their average annual real total earnings grew from
$103,962 in 1981 (which is equal to $251,560.03 in the 2013 dollar) to $120,743 (or
$292,165.53 in the 2013 dollar) in 1985. Bonuses count for approximately 25% of their
total pay in each year. From Panel C, in each year, about 12% -14% of the executives
are promoted, 10% -12% are laterally moved, and 2.0% -2.8% are demoted.24 We can
see that in this dataset lateral moves are as prevalent as promotions. In addition, 42%
of the executives have no lateral moves or promotions across the sample years. About
3.3% of them have more than one promotion within the five years of the sample; while
about 7.7% of them have more than one lateral move. In addition, among executives
who have a promotion following a lateral move within the sample years, a promotion is
earned 1.5 years, on average, after a lateral move.
1.4.2 Empirical Tests
In this subsection, I test the theoretical predictions regarding lateral moves, promotions,
wage changes and education. I first present the empirical evidence regarding lateral
moves and promotion probabilities (Corollary 1). Then I discuss lateral moves and wage
23The median age of the workforce is 42.1 in 2011 according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The
median working age should be lower in the 1980s given an aging workforce in the US.
24The lateral move rate is 23.5% from 1984 to 1985. This spike is caused by an increasing number
of unit level changes from 1984 to 1985 and the fact that lateral moves are defined as a within level
movement with a unit level or job title change. In the following analysis, only the effect of lateral moves
in 1982 and 1983 are considered. So the spike in the 1985 lateral move rate is not a concern.
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changes (Corollary 2). The relationship between education and lateral moves (Corollary
3) is investigated last.
Lateral moves and future promotion probabilities
Corollary 1 states that lateral moves in the current period are associated with a higher
probability of promotion in the next period. As I discussed before, this positive relation-
ship contains two effects. First, there is a positive selection on workers’ expected ability,
meaning, higher ability workers (relative to non-movers) are laterally moved. Second,
lateral moves have a permanent effect on workers’ human capital development and en-
able them to reach a higher human capital level upon promotion. Thus, lateral moves
make the worker more likely to be promoted. The second effect can be understood as
the treatment effect of lateral moves.
Empirically, the selection effect should be accounted for by controlling for workers’
expected ability. To do this, I use individuals’ past period’s total pay as a proxy for
workers’ expected ability. From the theoretical model, firms form expectations about
workers’ abilities upon observing their outputs. Given a competitive market, workers’
outputs are equal to their total pay. Therefore, individuals’ past period’s total pay is a
proxy for expected output (and expected ability). Furthermore, I control for individuals’
outputs at the initial level when they first enter the sample.25 In addition, the theoretical
model considers workers who enter the job market (i.e., the lower level jobs) at the
same time. This translates into controlling for age and tenure empirically. I also control
25Previous studies have used subjective performance evaluation measures as a control for expected out-
put (DeVaro and Waldman, 2012). In more recent studies, Gittings (2012) and DeVaro (2012) have used
bonus as a measure of expected output. My data does not contain information on subjective performance.
In addition, it is a well-established stylized fact that past wages and wage changes predict promotion
(Baker et. al., 1994b; Gibbs and Hendricks, 2004). Thus, I use past period’s total compensation as a
measure of expected output. I also use other compensation variables as measures of expected output and
the results are robust. See Table A.2 in the Appendix for details.
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Table 1.3: Lateral Moves and Subsequent Promotions by Year
Year of Promotion
1983 1984 1985
Year of Lateral Move No Yes No Yes No Yes
one year after two years after three years after
1982 Mover 1,078 153 657 132 411 81
87.6% 12.4% 83.3% 16.7% 83.5% 16.5%
Non- 7,830 1147 5050 906 3286 462
mover 87.2% 12.8% 84.8% 15.2% 87.7% 12.3%
one year after two years after
1983 Mover 1,011 192 547 108
84.0% 16.0% 83.5% 16.5%
Non- 6,918 1,238 6,785 978
mover 84.8% 15.2% 87.4% 12.6%
one year after
1984 Mover 825 117
87.6% 12.4%
Non- 5960 861
mover 87.4% 12.6%
Note: Sample restricted to executives who are not promoted in the current period
for individuals’ years of schooling and initial functional area to capture the general
education level and the education type in the theoretical model.
In practice, it is possible that promotion is not immediate after an initial move since
it may take several periods to develop the task-specific human capital for the upper-level
job and different individuals need different amounts of time to develop human capital.
Therefore, a more realistic interpretation of Corollary 1 is that a lateral move is posi-
tively correlated with promotion probabilities in periods after the move (not necessarily
the first period after the move).
Table 1.3 looks at lateral moves and their impact on future promotions in different
years. After the initial move, 12.4% of the 1982-lateral-movers are promoted in 1983
while a slightly higher proportion (12.8%) of the executives who stayed in the same po-
sition in 1982 are promoted in 1983. However, two years after the lateral move in 1982,
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among those who were not previously promoted, 16.7% of the 1982-lateral-movers are
promoted in 1984 while only 15.2% of the 1982-non-movers are promoted. This dif-
ference is even larger in 1985 - three years after the lateral move in 1982, 16.5% of the
movers are promoted while only 12.3% of the non-movers are promoted. This pattern
repeats for lateral moves in 1983.
To explore the effect of lateral moves on subsequent promotions, I estimate a re-
duced form model of promotion in which the probability of promotion is a function of
individual and firm characteristics and is affected by a previous lateral move. Rather
than pooling all lateral moves together, I consider lateral moves in different years sepa-
rately.26 The probability that executive i in firm m is promoted in period t is defined by
the following equation:
Prob(Promotionimt = 1) = (1.4)
F(δLateralimτ +βrrtotalimt−1+βpLevelimt−1+βFFmt−1+βUUnempt−1+Cim).
F(·) is a cumulative distribution function. Lateralimτ is a dummy variable that is
equal to one if an executive has been laterally moved in period τ(τ < t) and zero other-
wise. rtotalimt−1 is the total compensation in the previous period, which is the measure
of expected ability. Levelimt−1 is a set of dummies indicating the executives reporting
level in t− 1 (I exclude CEO (level 1) positions in the lateral-move year since CEO is
the highest position for promotion). Fmt−1 is a set of firm-specific variables, including
promotion opportunities, profits, sales and firm’s total employment in period t−1. Pro-
motion opportunities are defined as the percentage of executives hired from outside into
positions above a given individual. I also include changes of those firm characteristics
26If a pooled regression is considered, I still need to control for lateral moves in different years and
the time between lateral moves and promotions. This gives the same subsamples as I estimate separately.
In addition, since there is no the third-year after the move for lateral moves in 1983 (because the sample
ends in 1985), all the third-year effect of lateral moves on promotions comes from lateral moves in 1982.
Thus, by partitioning the sample by lateral moves in different years, I can present the result more clearly.
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from period t−1 to period t. Unempt−1 is the unemployment rate in period t−1, which
captures the overall labor market conditions. Cim captures other individual characteris-
tics. It consists of an observable component and an orthogonal unobserved component.
The specification takes the following form:
Cim = cX Xim0+ crrtotalim0+ cUUnempimh+ cAFAim0+uim. (1.5)
Xim0 is a set of human capital measures, including age, education, job tenure, and
firm tenure all measured at the point of time when individuals first enter into the sample.
rtotalim0 is the real total pay when an executive first enters into the sample. This mea-
sure controls for the pre-in-sample individual heterogeneity in expected productivity.
Unempimh is the unemployment rate when an executive is hired, which captures poten-
tial cohort effects upon hiring that might affect executives’ later career development.
FAim0 represents executives’ initial functional area at the time when they are observed.
It captures the initial matching effect (αi j) as specified in the theoretical analysis. uim
denotes the orthogonal unobserved component.
Conditional on individuals’ expected ability, the “treatment effect” of lateral moves
on promotions is captured by the lateral move dummy. Table 1.4 presents results from
estimating equation (1.4) using a Linear Probability Model (LPM). Column (1) fits a
pooled-OLS model. As we can see, a lateral move in 1982 increases the average proba-
bility of promotion in years after the move by 1.7%. To further control for unobserved
individual heterogeneity, in column (2), I fit a LPM with Random Effect. The effect of
lateral moves is still positive but not statistically significant.
While lateral moves exhibit positive effects on future promotions in the full sample,
the results might be biased since the 1982 and 1983 entry cohorts are not “at risk” to
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lateral moves in 1982. For example, when we consider the effect of lateral moves in
1982 on 1983’s promotions, only individuals who enter the sample in 1981 are subject
to a lateral move in 1982. Individuals who enter the sample in 1982 and 1983 are au-
tomatically counted as non-lateral-movers. These entrants may increase the probability
that a non-mover is not promoted (if those new entrants in 1982 are not promoted in
1983) and thus exaggerate the effect of lateral moves on promotions. To make sure we
measure the effect of lateral moves on individuals who are subject to lateral moves, in
columns (3) and (4) I restrict the sample to individuals who enter the sample in 1981
such that they are subject to lateral moves in 1982. Similarly, in column (7) and (8) I
restrict the observations to individuals who enter the sample in either 1981 or 1982 such
that they are subject to lateral moves in 1983. I further restrict the sample to levels 2 to
6 in the period when the lateral moves occur.27
In the restricted sample, lateral moves continue to exhibit positive impact on future
promotions but the magnitude is much smaller than that in the full sample for the 1982
moves. For example, column (3) tells us that a laterally moved worker in 1982 is 0.7%
more likely to earn a promotion in periods after 1982. However, this effect is not sta-
tistically significant. As I argued in the previous section, the effect of lateral moves on
promotions might not be immediate after the move. Therefore, in column (4) I allow the
effect of lateral moves to vary over time. To be specific, I include interaction terms of
lateral move status by year-after-the-move. We can see that lateral moves exhibit strong
positive correlation with promotion probabilities two years after the move. In particular,
a lateral move in 1982 increases the probability of promotion in 1984 - two years after
the move - by 5.3%. It increases the probability of promotion in 1985 - three years after
the move - by 9.2%. However, there is a negative effect of lateral moves on promotions
one year after the move. One explanation is that it may take several years for a moved
27Table A.1 summarizes lateral moves in each year by level. We can see that there is a sudden drop in
the number of lateral moves beyond level 6.
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individual to develop sufficient human capital in the new position to warrant promotion.
Given that the average length of a lateral-move-promotion spell in this sample is 1.5
years, it is reasonable that we do not see a positive effect of lateral moves on promotions
one year after the move. The same pattern repeats with the 1983-lateral-moves. The
results in column (4) and (8) suggest that we need to allow the effect of the move to
differ over time because the average result across years does not fully capture the effect
of lateral moves on promotion.28
The LPM provides some support for the prediction that lateral moves are positively
associated with promotions. In Table 1.5, I estimate equation (1.4) with a non-linear
model (applied to the restricted sample only). To keep the estimation strategy straight-
forward, I assume the orthogonal component in the individual heterogeneity (i.e. uim
in equation (1.5)) follows a normal distribution and thus I implement a Random Effect
Probit model using Butler and Moffitt’s (1982) method. I fit a pooled Probit model in
columns (1) and (5) and a Probit model with Random Effect in columns (2) and (6)
controlling for individual characteristics. The effect of lateral moves in either 1982 or
1983 is positive but insignificant.
In columns (3) and (6), I allow the effect of lateral moves to vary over time. The
results are consistent with those in the LPM. Lateral moves are associated with a 3.1% -
3.4% increase in the marginal probability of promotion two years after the move. There
is a negative effect associated with the 1982-moves one year after the move. Note that
the effects of lateral moves might be underestimated since we do not observe the full
employment history. For example, when we consider the effect of a 1982-lateral-move
on 1983-promotion-probability, a promoted worker in 1983 who is not moved in 1982
but is moved in 1981 will add to the probability of observing a non-mover in 1982 being
28The results from pooled OLS Models (instead of the Random Effect Models) are very similar to those
in Table 1.4, columns (3), (4), (7) and (8). The estimates are available up on request.
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promoted in 1983, but in fact the 1983-promotion is due to an unobserved 1981-move.
Since I do not observe the whole employment history of a worker after they enter the
firm, I cannot eliminate this bias.29
Overall, lateral moves are positively correlated with subsequent promotions. The
positive effect is strong two years after the move. This result suggests that it may take
an executive more than one year after a lateral move to acquire enough task-skills to
warrant subsequent promotions.30
Lateral moves and future wage growth
In this subsection, I investigate the relationship between lateral moves and wage changes
(Corollary 2). Figure 1.1 plots the raw compensation data against years by lateral-
move status in 1982 and 1983. The top two graphs compare the wage profiles of the
1982-lateral-movers and the 1982-non-movers. Without controlling for other covari-
ates, the average total pay and the base pay of the 1982-lateral-movers are below those
of the 1982-non-movers. There is no obvious difference in the rates of wage growth
between the 1982-movers and the 1982-non-movers from 1981 to 1982. However, lat-
eral movers’ wages start to grow faster in years after the move. The bottom two graphs
plot the total pay and the base pay of the 1983-movers and the 1983-non-movers. In
1983, there is not much difference in terms of the total pay and the base pay between
the movers and the non-movers, but the movers’ wages grow much faster than the non-
movers’ after 1983. These raw plots are consistent with Corollary 2 that wage growth
for movers is larger in the post-move periods.
29I also cluster standard errors in the non-linear model at both individual and firm levels. The results
are consistent with what I find in Tables 1.4 and 1.5. See Table A.3 in the Appendix for details.
30This is a discrepancy between the current version of the model and the empirical findings. If I
extend the model to more than three periods, I can capture this specific timing. However, all other results
concerning lateral moves and promotions should stay the same.
38
 Figure 1.1: Real Compensation changes and lateral move status in 1982 and 1983.
39
Ta
bl
e
1.
6:
L
at
er
al
M
ov
es
an
d
R
ea
lC
om
pe
ns
at
io
n
C
ha
ng
es
(i
n
19
82
do
lla
r)
af
te
rt
he
M
ov
es
:P
oo
le
d
O
L
S
L
at
er
al
M
ov
es
in
82
(τ
=8
2;
t=
83
,8
4,
85
)
L
at
er
al
M
ov
es
in
83
(τ
=8
3;
t=
84
,8
5)
R
ea
lC
om
p.
C
ha
ng
e
fr
om
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
th
e
Ye
ar
of
th
e
M
ov
es
:
To
ta
l(
t-
τ)
B
as
e
(t
-τ
)
B
on
us
(t
-τ
)
To
ta
l(
t-
τ)
B
as
e
(t
-τ
)
B
on
us
(t
-τ
)
La
te
ra
lm
ov
e
ef
fe
ct
by
ye
ar
L
at
er
al
(τ
)*
Y
ea
r1
-2
,5
02
.4
59
**
*
-2
,0
56
.1
76
**
*
-4
46
.2
84
33
5.
12
2
-9
80
.8
02
**
*
1,
31
5.
92
3*
*
(6
61
.5
44
)
(2
47
.7
00
)
(5
73
.5
34
)
(6
73
.1
16
)
(3
16
.0
55
)
(5
51
.5
03
)
L
at
er
al
(τ
)*
Y
ea
r2
3,
83
7.
63
2*
**
1,
73
0.
14
2*
**
2,
10
7.
49
0*
**
6,
02
1.
85
9*
**
2,
62
2.
19
9*
**
3,
39
9.
66
0*
**
(9
53
.5
59
)
(4
12
.5
55
)
(7
90
.3
10
)
(1
,2
76
.0
22
)
(5
05
.2
14
)
(1
,0
40
.3
59
)
L
at
ea
rl
(τ
)*
Y
ea
r3
8,
47
4.
81
5*
**
4,
62
6.
42
8*
**
3,
84
8.
38
6*
**
-
-
-
(1
,7
03
.5
92
)
(7
41
.0
77
)
(1
,2
72
.4
35
)
-
-
-
L
ev
el
s
(t
)
L
ev
el
1
64
,2
91
.9
96
**
*
57
,9
15
.9
17
**
*
6,
37
6.
08
2
54
,8
39
.8
43
**
53
,1
03
.6
55
**
*
1,
73
6.
18
6
(1
5,
01
2.
20
8)
(7
,6
07
.9
17
)
(1
1,
00
6.
93
5)
(2
2,
08
6.
48
1)
(8
,4
65
.3
47
)
(1
9,
75
4.
50
5)
L
ev
el
2
10
,4
26
.6
95
**
*
8,
13
7.
21
8*
**
2,
28
9.
47
7*
12
,8
61
.5
63
**
*
6,
72
4.
13
3*
**
6,
13
7.
43
0*
**
(1
,7
06
.1
19
)
(8
17
.9
94
)
(1
,2
80
.8
28
)
(1
,6
46
.4
18
)
(6
67
.1
33
)
(1
,3
68
.0
44
)
L
ev
el
3
3,
45
0.
46
0*
**
2,
90
2.
71
5*
**
54
7.
74
5
5,
30
0.
00
7*
**
2,
21
4.
05
4*
**
3,
08
5.
95
3*
**
(7
82
.0
28
)
(3
91
.2
94
)
(5
64
.5
58
)
(6
72
.1
15
)
(2
66
.6
80
)
(5
83
.3
75
)
L
ev
el
4
1,
30
0.
45
0*
*
1,
11
5.
02
2*
**
18
5.
42
8
3,
00
2.
91
6*
**
83
5.
03
2*
**
2,
16
7.
88
4*
**
(5
71
.7
52
)
(3
09
.6
97
)
(3
83
.0
77
)
(4
20
.1
30
)
(1
78
.9
72
)
(3
69
.8
95
)
L
ev
el
5
12
3.
86
7
43
8.
98
4
-3
15
.1
18
99
4.
16
6*
**
18
2.
77
9
81
1.
38
7*
**
(4
98
.1
90
)
(2
86
.5
96
)
(3
16
.1
01
)
(3
38
.5
56
)
(1
50
.4
78
)
(2
83
.9
70
)
L
ev
el
6+
R
ef
.
R
ef
.
R
ef
.
R
ef
.
R
ef
.
R
ef
.
(T
ab
le
co
nt
in
ue
s)
40
(T
ab
le
co
nt
in
ue
s
fr
om
th
e
pr
ev
io
us
pa
ge
)
∆
Fi
rm
C
ha
r.
(t
)
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
∆
U
ne
m
p.
R
at
e
(t
)
-3
,8
34
.0
26
**
-1
,7
85
.7
83
*
-2
,0
48
.2
44
**
*
-1
,4
19
.2
05
-4
.6
83
-1
,4
14
.5
22
*
(1
,6
56
.1
40
)
(1
,0
73
.1
13
)
(7
37
.9
09
)
(1
,4
56
.3
34
)
(8
41
.9
54
)
(8
31
.8
54
)
In
di
vi
du
al
In
iti
al
C
ha
r.
E
du
ca
tio
n
66
2.
85
2*
**
31
0.
17
6*
**
35
2.
67
6*
**
69
2.
45
9*
**
95
.3
69
59
7.
09
0*
**
(1
53
.0
75
)
(7
0.
62
8)
(1
22
.8
83
)
(1
50
.5
62
)
(6
3.
78
8)
(1
23
.9
54
)
A
ge
-4
8.
11
8
27
2.
53
1*
*
-3
20
.6
49
37
6.
65
2
33
.0
44
34
3.
60
7
(2
88
.4
46
)
(1
29
.6
20
)
(2
35
.1
09
)
(2
58
.2
50
)
(1
07
.0
21
)
(2
14
.0
77
)
A
ge
2
-1
.4
42
-4
.7
66
**
*
3.
32
5
-6
.3
37
**
-1
.9
35
-4
.4
02
*
(3
.1
27
)
(1
.3
93
)
(2
.5
79
)
(2
.9
10
)
(1
.1
87
)
(2
.4
28
)
Jo
b
te
nu
re
-4
18
.6
10
**
*
-1
02
.9
93
**
*
-3
15
.6
18
**
*
-3
24
.4
51
**
*
-1
40
.2
16
**
*
-1
84
.2
34
**
*
(7
2.
64
0)
(3
3.
12
9)
(6
1.
84
5)
(7
3.
17
1)
(3
0.
10
0)
(5
9.
82
1)
E
m
p.
te
nu
re
10
1.
40
1*
**
5.
26
4
96
.1
37
**
*
11
2.
34
3*
**
35
.9
09
**
*
76
.4
34
**
(3
5.
77
7)
(1
5.
32
8)
(2
9.
05
8)
(3
5.
06
7)
(1
2.
93
4)
(2
9.
76
4)
To
ta
lP
ay
(1
0k
)(
in
iti
al
)
-5
4.
72
0
32
1.
54
3*
**
-3
76
.2
63
**
*
73
5.
11
6*
**
32
6.
32
6*
**
40
8.
79
0*
**
(1
44
.4
13
)
(5
2.
77
7)
(1
19
.1
73
)
(1
23
.4
95
)
(3
8.
37
0)
(1
12
.2
62
)
Fu
nc
tio
na
lA
re
as
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
C
on
st
an
t
-1
,9
48
.0
69
-6
,1
53
.6
93
*
4,
20
5.
62
3
-1
5,
39
8.
53
8*
*
1,
64
0.
46
0
-1
7,
03
8.
99
5*
**
(7
,0
73
.4
03
)
(3
,2
33
.4
28
)
(5
,6
90
.9
23
)
(6
,4
02
.6
42
)
(2
,6
65
.8
71
)
(5
,3
09
.8
73
)
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
19
,4
16
19
,4
16
19
,4
16
13
,5
12
13
,5
12
13
,5
12
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
06
8
0.
17
2
0.
04
6
0.
17
0
0.
19
7
0.
10
5
N
ot
e
-R
ob
us
ts
ta
nd
ar
d
er
ro
rs
ar
e
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s;
cl
us
te
d
at
fir
m
-i
nd
iv
id
ua
ll
ev
el
Sa
m
pl
e
re
st
ri
ct
ed
to
ex
ec
ut
iv
es
w
ho
ar
e
no
tp
ro
m
ot
ed
in
th
e
cu
rr
en
tp
er
io
d.
*
St
at
is
tic
al
ly
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
th
e
10
%
le
ve
l.
**
St
at
is
tic
al
ly
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
th
e
5%
le
ve
l.
**
*
St
at
is
tic
al
ly
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
th
e
1%
le
ve
l.
41
Since the effect of lateral moves on wage growth is realized upon promotion and the
effect of lateral moves on promotion probabilities might not be immediate, we would
expect the effect of lateral moves on wages to differ over time in practice. Therefore, I
allow for different effects of lateral moves on wage changes in different periods after a
lateral move.31 Since wage changes are considered, I only control for changes in firms’
characteristics rather than base levels. I estimate the wage change by the following
specification:
wimt−wimτ (1.6)
=ηLateralimτ +ψpLevelimt +ψF∆Fmt +ψU∆Unempt +C˜im.
Lateralimτ is a vector of dummies indicating lateral move status by year-after-the-
move. For lateral moves in 1982, this vector includes interaction terms of the lateral-
move dummy in 1982 with year dummies for 1983, 1984, and 1985. For lateral moves
in 1983, this vector includes interaction terms of the lateral-move dummy in 1983 with
year dummies for 1984 and 1985. The individual characteristic, C˜im, is defined similarly
as in equation (1.4). The only difference is that I include an age-squared term to capture
the non-monotonic wage-age profile. Since the theory does not distinguish between
base pay and total pay, I estimate equation (1.6) using OLS with clustered standard
errors (on firm-individual level) for changes in total compensation, base pay, as well as
bonus pay. I consider wage levels rather than log wages because the theoretical model
only generates results concerning wage levels.32
The results from estimating the wage equation in (1.6) are shown in Table 1.6. Col-
umn (1) says that the total compensation change of a 1982-mover from 1982 to 1984 is
31Note that the wage difference is calculated as the wage growth from the period of the lateral moves
to the current period. This is to match the theoretical model. In the theoretical model, lateral moves affect
the expected wage growth from the period of lateral moves to the period of promotion.
32Note that in the wage equation, I do not include a variable to control for the expected productivity
because by taking the difference in wages, the expected ability cancels out.
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$3,838 larger than that of a 1982-non-mover. Similarly, the total compensation change
of a 1982-mover from 1982 to 1985 is $8,475 larger than that of a 1982-non-mover.
However, a mover has a smaller total compensation change than a non-mover from 1982
to 1983. From Tables 1.4 and 1.5 , we know that a mover is less likely to be promoted
than a non-mover one year after the move (recall that there is a negative effect of lateral
moves on promotions one year after the moves). Thus, the smaller wage change is due
to non-promotion.33 In contrast, the movers have a larger wage change two years after
the move when they are more likely to be promoted relative to the movers. This pattern
repeats for different measures of compensation and for lateral moves in 1983.34
As discussed in the previous section, while lateral moves are associated with current
task-specific human capital losses, it is also associated with positive learning about in-
dividuals’ innate ability. The net effect of lateral moves on wage growth in the period
of lateral move depends on which effect dominates. I estimate a specification similar to
equation (1.6) except that the dependent variable is the wage growth in the period of lat-
eral move from the period before the move. The equation I estimate takes the following
form:
wimτ −wimτ−1 (1.7)
=κLateralimτ + γpLevelimτ + γF∆Fmτ + γU∆Unempτ +C˜im+ εimτ .
Table 1.7 shows that lateral movers in either 1982 or 1983 have larger pay increases
in the period of lateral moves despite that we lose some significance in the bonus mea-
sure. The positive relationship between lateral moves and wage growth in the period of
lateral moves suggests that the positive learning associated with a lateral move domi-
33Since the theory does not distinguish between promoted movers and non-promoted movers, I do not
control for promotion status in the wage equation.
34As robustness checks, I also cluster the standardard error at the firm level and estimate a Random
Effect model. The results are consistant with the estimates in Table 1.6. See Table A.4 in the Appendix
for details.
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nates the potential human capital losses.
Education and lateral moves
I now examine the relationship between education and lateral moves. As discussed in
Corollary 3, there is a negative relationship between the probability of a lateral move
and the education level.35 To test this, I estimate a model that is very similar to equation
(1.4) except that the dependent variable now is a dummy variable that is equal to one
if an individual has an in-sample lateral move in year τ and zero otherwise. I include
a full set of dummies for years of schooling. The reference group is years of schooling
below 16 years. To be specific, for the executives who are not promoted in period τ ,
the probability that executive i in firm m is laterally moved is defined by the following
equation:
Prob(Lateralimτ = 1) = (1.8)
F(pie1educimτ +pirrtotalimt−1+pipLevelimτ−1+piFFmτ−1+piUUnempτ−1+Cˆim).
educimτ is a set of education dummies. The covariates in Cˆim are similar to those
specified in equation (1.5) except that the education term is not included. Table 1.8
presents the results from estimating equation (1.8) using both a Random Effect LPM
and a Random Effect Probit Model. As shown in columns (1) and (2), there is a strong
negative relationship between lateral moves and years of schooling after 19 years. This
relationship is more significant in the Probit model than in the linear probability model.
This may due to the fact that the linear probability model is not a very good approxi-
mation for extreme values. There is a positive but statistically insignificant relationship
35In the data, no individuals with years of schooling higher than 21 are laterally moved, which matches
the theoretical prediction. However, since only a small number of individuals have more than 21 years
of schooling in my sample, it is possible that the true probability of a lateral move for an individual with
more than 21 years of schooling is positive.
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Table 1.8: Education and Lateral Moves
Dependent Variable: (1) (2)
Lateral move (τ)=1 if yes LPM-RE Probit-RE Margins
Years of Education (τ) =
<16 Ref. Ref. Ref.
16 0.004 0.018 0.004
(0.006) (0.026) (0.006)
17 0.007 0.032 0.008
(0.008) (0.034) (0.008)
18 0.008 0.030 0.007
(0.008) (0.033) (0.008)
19 -0.025** -0.152*** -0.032***
(0.011) (0.049) (0.010)
20 -0.022* -0.109** -0.024**
(0.011) (0.049) (0.010)
21 -0.153 -4.859 -0.157***
(0.152) (367.046) (0.006)
22 -0.138 -4.582 -0.157***
(0.214) (540.805) (0.006)
Past in-sample observables
Total Pay (10k)(τ-1) 0.006*** 0.030*** 0.007***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
Levels (τ-1) Yes Yes Yes
Unemp. Rate (τ-1) 0.016*** 0.074*** 0.017***
(0.005) (0.021) (0.005)
Firm Characteristics (τ-1) Yes Yes Yes
Individual Initial Char.
Age -0.003*** -0.013*** -0.003***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Job Tenure -0.002*** -0.011*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Employer Tenure 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Unemp Rate at hiring -0.017*** -0.076*** -0.017***
(0.005) (0.021) (0.005)
Total Pay/Age (initial) -0.006*** -0.026*** -0.006***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
Functional Areas Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.357*** -0.238*** -
(0.017) (0.074) -
σu 0.116 0.411 -
σe 0.354 - -
ρ 0.0972 0.145 -
N. of Observations 45,212 45,212
N. of firm-individuals 18,139 18,139
N. of quadrature points - 12
Log likelihood - -19883
Note - Standard errors are in parentheses; clusted at firm-individual level
Sample restricted to executives who are not promoted in the current period.
* Statistically significant at the 10% level.
** Statistically significant at the 5% level.
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
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between lateral moves and years of schooling for schooling years before 19. These pat-
terns are consistent with the model that for workers with very high levels of education,
the probability of lateral move is negatively correlated with years of education. For
workers with low or median levels of education, the relationship between education and
lateral moves is inconclusive and depends on how different the upper level and the lower
level jobs are.
1.5 Alternative Explanations
In this section, I discuss two potential alternative explanations for the empirical findings
in Section 1.4, (i) contracted job rotation and (ii) worker-job matching through lateral
moves.
Job rotation is a special type of lateral move with a pre-determined career path.
When job rotation is merit-based, i.e., promising workers are selected into the job ro-
tation program, and is designed to provide employee learning through human capital
accumulation, job rotation and the lateral move mechanisms described in my model
are in essence the same. Those job rotation programs that improve the match between
workers and firms are mainly for entry-level workers. Campion et al. (1994) find that
young workers are more likely to engage in job rotations, while upper level managers
are more likely to engage in a mechanism that provides “a broader scope of the business
operations” to the managers. Since I have a senior sample I argue that matching-type of
job rotations are unlikely to be the main contract arrangement for the individuals in my
sample.
Another closely related explanation is that lateral moves (without a rotation pro-
gram) improve worker-job matching. Borrowing from Novos’s (1995) idea about how
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turnover improves worker-job matching, let us consider a modeling environment without
human capital accumulation but lateral moves improve worker-job matches. If a worker
matches with job A badly, she moves to job B. If the match-quality or job-preference
is private information, it is not very intuitive to argue why this worker should be a bet-
ter candidate for the upper-level job relative to a worker who is a good match for job
A. In reality, lateral moves might improve worker-job matching. However, worker-job
matching is unlikely to drive the results that we observed in the data such as the positive
relationship between promotion probability and lateral moves.
1.6 Conclusion
Lateral moves play an important role in individuals’ career development since they facil-
itate human capital development. However, studies in the literature on career and wage
dynamics inside firms focus almost exclusively on promotions. In this essay I extend
the theory by incorporating lateral moves into a job assignment model with learning and
task-specific human capital accumulation. I also examine how the publicly observed
education levels affect individuals’ lateral moves. This model generates a set of new
testable predictions concerning the relationship between lateral moves and promotion
probability, wage changes, as well as education.
I test the model’s predictions using a large employer-employee linked panel in the
United States. My empirical results support the theoretical model to a large extent. I find
that, controlling for tenure and unobserved heterogeneity, laterally moved workers are
more likely to be promoted two years after the move compared to workers who stayed
in the same position. I also find that laterally moved workers experience a larger wage
growth in periods after the move compared to workers who stayed in the same posi-
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tion. In addition, the probability of a lateral move among those who are not promoted
decreases with years of education for those with more than 19 years of schooling.
This study can be extended in several directions. Theoretically, I plan on incorpo-
rating turnover into the model to consider lateral mobility across firms. Second, I can
introduce some asymmetry in the production process for the lower level jobs to analyze
different promotion paths (Clemens, 2012; Sasaki et al., 2012; Bezil et al., 2012). Em-
pirically, I want to test the relationship between MBA training and lateral moves. Mur-
phy and Zabojnik (2006) show that there are an increasing number of newly appointed
CEOs with an MBA degree. If MBA training can substitute for task-skills (especially
general management skills) acquired on the job, I expect a decrease in the number of
lateral moves before promotion to the CEO position in later years.
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CHAPTER 2
THE SIGNALING ROLE OF NOT BEING PROMOTED: THEORY AND
EVIDENCE
2.1 Introduction
Promotion sends positive signals about a worker’s ability and productivity. This theoret-
ical possibility has been extensively studied in a body of literature stemming from Wald-
man (1984a), who formulates a two-job-level two-period model. Waldman assumes that
a worker’s current employer has better information about a worker’s true ability by ob-
serving this worker at work. Potential employers can only infer the worker’s ability by
observing her current period’s job assignment made by the incumbent firm. Waldman’s
two main conclusions are (1) promotions send positive signals about workers’ abilities
and thus are associated with substantial wage increases; (2) the incumbent firm pro-
motes fewer employees than what is socially optimal and this distortion is more severe
when workers’ human capital is general rather than firm specific.
While the signals associated with promotion have been extensively examined, the
signals associated with non-promotion, on the other hand, are surprisingly understudied.
In this essay, I extend the promotion-as-signal framework by arguing that additional
years of job-level tenure (i.e., non-promotion) sends negative signals about a worker’s
ability. Intuitively, if a worker stays in the same job level for many years while her
peers are all promoted, this worker is believed to be less competent (or is less likely
to be a productive worker). These negative beliefs eventually translate into small wage
increases or even wage decreases.
Although the basic idea is intuitive, formal theoretical models that explore this nega-
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tive signaling idea are almost non-existent. Bernhardt (1995) is the only previous study
that captures the negative signals associated with not being promoted. In that study,
Bernhardt argues that there is a negative sorting in promotion such that abler workers
are promoted earlier. However, that analysis makes ambiguous predictions regarding
the implications of the negative sorting for workers’ wage dynamics. In this essay, I
build a T-period model with two job levels to explore the negative signaling role of
non-promotion on workers’ wage dynamics.
My model shows that when a worker stays in the same job level for a long time, her
wages first increase then decrease with additional job-level tenure. To see the logic, con-
sider a set up where a worker’s productivity is jointly determined by her expected ability
and on-the-job human capital accumulation. Firms use non-promotion as signals to infer
workers’ abilities. If firms keep on receiving negative signals about a worker’s ability
from non-promotion, this worker is perceived less likely to be a productive worker.
The negative signals associated with additional job-tenure eventually cause the non-
promoted workers’ wages to fall since productivity rises little with additional job-level
tenure after the worker spends a long time on the same job. But since human capital
accumulates very fast when a worker first starts on a job, the fast human capital accu-
mulation outweighs the downward adjustment (due to non-promotion) in beliefs about
a worker’s expected ability and therefore the non-promoted workers’ wages rise with
job-tenure even though there is negative learning about their abilities.
From the above reasoning, if one only considers the learning component in the wage
determination process, wages should decrease with additional job-tenure. On the other
hand, if one only considers the human capital component, wages should increase then
flatten out with additional tenure on the same job. By bringing together the learning
argument and human capital theory, I can explain two wage patterns observed in Baker
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et al. (1994a). First, pre-promotion wages increase then decrease with job-level tenure.
Second, the wages in the periods of promotion increase then decrease with job-level
tenure on the lower level job.
This essay contributes to the literature in several different ways. First, it fills a gap in
the learning literature by capturing the negative signaling role of non-promotion. Sec-
ond, it contributes to the human capital literature by exploring the relationship between
wages and job-level tenure. Third, it provides an explanation for a set of empirical find-
ings that are not well captured in existing models. It also provides empirical evidence
that is consistent with my model’s predictions.
The outline of the essay is as follows. The next section reviews the related litera-
ture. Section 3 sets up the model. In Section 4, I first analyze a T-period model with
full information then compare equilibrium behavior in this benchmark model to equilib-
rium behavior in a model with asymmetric information. I present empirical evidence in
Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
This essay connects two theoretical building blocks in the existing literature on wage and
career dynamics inside firms - learning and on-the-job human-capital accumulation.
The learning literature falls into two broad categories. One set of papers assumes
symmetric learning where workers’ outputs are observed by all firms in the market (Har-
ris and Holmstrom, 1982). The other set of papers assumes asymmetric learning where
a worker’s current employer privately observes the worker’s output. The asymmetric
learning literature further divides into two areas of focus. One set of papers investi-
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gates the adverse selection issue in labor market turnover following Greenwald (1986).
The other set of papers explores the idea of promotions as signals following Waldman
(1984a). My essay builds on the promotion-as-signal approach under asymmetric learn-
ing.
The promotion-as-signal approach has been extended in many different ways.
Ricart-i-Costa (1988) considers a two-period n-job-level model. Bernhardt (1995) con-
siders a two-level model with infinite periods. In Zabojnik and Bernhardt (2001), a
promotion signal contains information about workers’ human-capital investment rather
than their innate ability. DeVaro and Waldman (2012) consider how promotion sig-
nals vary with education.1 The promotion-as-signal approach has also been extended
to analyze up-or-out contracts and turnover (Bernhardt and Scoones, 1999; Ghosh and
Waldman, 2010). Waldman (1984a) and the various extensions capture many stylized
facts about wage and promotion dynamics, such as large wage increases upon promotion
(Bernhardt, 1995) and the wage-and-firm-size effect (Zabojnik and Bernhardt, 2001),
etc. Yet, these studies have almost exclusively focused on the positive signals associ-
ated with promotion. My essay fills a gap in the learning literature by exploring the
negative signals associated with non-promotion.
Another important perspective concerning workers’ wage and career dynamics in-
side firms is on-the-job human-capital acquisition. Numerous empirical studies have
investigated the contribution of firm tenure and total labor market experience to individ-
uals’ wage growth and find a concave wage-firm-tenure profile using household surveys
(Altonji and Shakotko, 1987; Topel, 1991; Altonji and Williams, 2005; Sullivan, 2010;
Pavan, 2011).2 On the other hand, using a 1% sample of the British labor force, Dev-
1DeVaro and Waldman (2012) treat education as a measure of initial human capital stock, not as
another source of signals.
2Sanders and Taber (2012) provide a comprehensive survey of the literature on life-cycle wage growth
and heterogeneous human-capital accumulation.
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ereux et. al. (2013) find a hump-shaped relation between wages and job-tenure when
they do not control for firm-tenure.3 Using firms’ personnel records, Baker at al. (1994a)
also find a hump-shaped wage-job-tenure profile for non-promoted workers, i.e., their
wages first increase with job-tenure then decrease.
While standard human capital accumulation theory can explain the increase of wages
with job-tenure when workers are new to a job, it cannot explain why wages fall when
workers stay on the same job for a long time. The asymmetric learning framework with
human capital accumulation in Waldman (1984a) might potentially explain the hump-
shaped wage-job-tenure relation, however, neither the original ’84 model nor most of
the later extensions in the promotion-as-signal literature capture the negative signals
of non-promotion. There are two reasons. First, those models assume that a worker’s
current employer learns about the worker’s ability perfectly after one period of employ-
ment. Second, many of those models have a strong “winner’s curse” in their equilibrium
(Milgrom and Oster, 1987). In models with asymmetric learning, firms only observe the
job assignments of the workers at other firms (they still observe the output of their own
workers). When the winner’s curse occurs, the wage offer a firm is willing to make to
a non-promoted worker at another firm is determined by the lowest possible expected
ability level among workers with the same job assignment history. Furthermore, this
lowest expected ability does not vary with job-level tenure for the non-promoted worker
if the current employer learns the worker’s ability perfectly after a period. Thus, the
signal associated with non-promotion does not cause further adjustments in wage offers
to pervious employees and thus wages actually paid.4 My model moves away from the
3They find a negative relation between job tenure and wages holding firm tenure constant. But in
their study, they do not control for levels and they do not distinguish between promoted workers and
non-promoted workers. So the negative relation between job tenure and wages may capture the wage
difference between the promoted workers who have very short job-tenure and the non-promoted workers
who in general have longer job-tenure in the current job.
4In the ’84 model, the output on the lower level job is assumed to be a constant. Thus, we should ob-
serve wages stay constant with additional job tenure. In later extensions, workers’ outputs are determined
by their expected abilities and human capital levels. With a strong winner’s curse, we should observe
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strong winner’s curse problem by assuming the existence of exogenous turnover as in
Greenwald (1986). With exogenous movers, outside firms are willing to offer wages that
are above the expected productivity of the lowest ability worker within a certain job as-
signment history. That is, there are further adjustments in wages when a non-promotion
is observed.
The only previous paper that captures negative signals associated with non-
promotion is Bernhardt (1995). Bernhardt considers a framework with human capital
accumulation and asymmetric learning without the winner’s curse. However, his model
predicts that the non-promoted workers’ wages can either increase or decrease with ad-
ditional tenure but the relationship is monotonic. In addition, Bernhardt focuses on the
relationship between wages and firm-tenure. However, the household surveys show that
workers’ wages do not fall overall with firm-tenure. As shown in Baker et al. (1994a),
workers’ wages only fall with job-tenure when they stay a long time on the same job
level.
In summary, most of the existing promotion-as-signal models do not capture the
negative signals of non-promotion. The only theoretical model capturing this idea makes
predictions that do not match the evidence. By combining the asymmetric learning
argument and human capital theory, I develop a tractable framework to capture a set
of empirical findings in Baker et al. (1994a). In particular, Baker et al. show that,
for a worker who stays in the same job level for more than six years, her wages first
increase then decrease. In addition, if a worker earns a promotion within four or five
years of entering into a job level, her wage in the period of promotion is higher than the
promotion wage paid to a worker who was promoted in the previous period. But if the
promotion is more than four or five years after entering into the job level, her wage upon
wages increase with tenure in those models due to human-capital accumulation because a non-promoted
worker’s expected output is independent of her ability.
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promotion is lower than the promotion wage paid to a worker who was promoted in the
previous period.
2.3 The Model
In this section, I set up a T-period model to analyze the role of non-promotion on work-
ers’ wage dynamics.
There is free entry into the market. All firms are identical with two job levels. The
manager jobs (m) are on the upper level and the laborer jobs (l) are on the lower level .
Workers enter the labor market in period 1. They are either good (g) or ordinary (r).
Let A denote workers’ ability types, i.e., A ∈ {g,r}. Neither the firms nor the workers
themselves observe the true type of a particular worker. However, their prior belief is
that a worker is good with probability p0. I assume p0 is sufficiently small that, given
the production function defined below, all workers are assigned to the laborer job in
period 1.
Outputs are jointly determined by workers’ ability types and their human capital lev-
els. Firms learn about workers’ types gradually by observing workers’ output realiza-
tions. This is a generalization of the setting in previous papers such as Waldman (1984a)
and Bernhardt (1995) where a worker’s current employer learns about the worker’s abil-
ity perfectly after a single period of employment. Human capital accumulates determin-
istically with tenure.
In each period, worker i attains high (H) productive efficiency with probability θi =
θA ∈ {θg,θr} and low productive efficiency with probability 1−θi. That is, a worker’s
ability type affects the probability of attaining high productive efficiency and a good
56
worker attains high productive efficiency with a higher probability, i.e., θg > θr. The
high or low production efficiency translates into different output realizations on different
job levels. To be specific, worker i’s output in period t if she is assigned to job j is
y jit =
{
(1+ st)[z
j
H + f (xit)] with prob. θi
(1+ st)[z
j
L+ f (xit)] with prob. (1−θi), j ∈ {l,m}.
(2.1)
I assume zmH > z
l
H > z
l
L > z
m
L > 0. This set up captures that the manager job has
greater returns to the high productive efficiency but the laborer job has greater returns
to the low productive efficiency. It also follows the standard assumption in the job
assignment literature as in Sattinger (1975) and Rosen (1982) that the manager job has
greater marginal returns to an increase in productive efficiency from low to high.
In addition, I assume that a good worker is on average more productive on the man-
ager job than on the laborer job but an ordinary worker is on average more productive
on the laborer job than on the manager job. Let E jA = θAz
j
H +(1− θA)z jL, A ∈ {g,r}.
Then Emg > E
l
g and E
l
r > E
m
r . This set up means that a good worker has a comparative
advantage producing as a manager but an ordinary worker has a comparative advantage
producing as a laborer (although a good worker is always more productive than an ordi-
nary worker on both jobs, i.e., E jg > E
j
r , j ∈ {l,m}). Therefore, firms have an incentive
to (correctly) assign a good worker to a manager position and an ordinary worker to a
laborer position.
Let qINCit denote the belief of an incumbent firm in period t that worker i is good based
on her output history.5 I refer to a worker’s previous period’s employer as the incumbent
firm and all other firms as outside firms. Since the speed of learning on the lower level
and the upper level job is the same, the belief that a worker is good is a function of
5Outside firms’ beliefs about workers’ ability types are based on workers’ job assignments at their in-
cumbent firms. I will discuss in more detail about how outside firms’ beliefs are determined in equilibrium
in the next section.
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whether or not a worker attains high (low) productive efficiency only. That is, at which
job level she has worked is irrelevant. In addition, given the binary ability types, only
the total number of high (or low) productive efficiencies that a worker attains matters
for the belief in a given period. Let ht−1i denote the total number of high productive
efficiencies that worker i has attained up to period t−1. The expected output of worker
i who is believed to be good with probability qit(ht−1i ) and who is assigned to job j in
period t is
E[y jit |qINCit (ht−1i )] = (1+ st){qINCit (ht−1i )[θgz jH +(1−θg)z jL] (2.2)
+[1−qINCit (ht−1i )][θrz jH +(1−θr)z jL]+ f (xit)}
= (1+ st){qINCit (ht−1i )E jg +[1−qit(ht−1i )]E jr + f (xit)}, j ∈ {l,m}.
xit is worker i’s labor market experience up to period t. f (·) is the human capital
accumulation function. Following Acemoglu and Pischke (1998), I assume f to be
twice continuous differentiable, strictly increasing, concave with f (0)≥ 0, lim
x→1
f
′
(x)=∞
and lim
x→t¯
f
′
(x) = 0 for some 2 ≤ t¯ ≤ T − 1. That is, human capital accumulates very
fast when tenure is low. When tenure is higher than t¯, human capital almost stops
growing with additional tenure. The human capital accumulation function enters into the
production function additively to the part of the output that is determined by workers’
innate abilities.
st = S > 0 if a worker is employed by her previous period’s employer in period
t. st = 0 otherwise. st thus captures firm-specific human capital. Following Bern-
hardt (1995), I assume that once a worker leaves her previous employer, her previous
employer becomes a new firm to her and cannot collect the firm-specific human cap-
ital anymore unless she comes back and works for her previous employer for another
period. This assumption guarantees that in each period only one firm can collect the
firm-specific human capital from a worker’s productivity. This means that workers do
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not have an incentive to constantly change employers to enable the firm-specific hu-
man capital in multiple firms. In practice, it is possible that after an employee leaves
a firm, the firm’ policy, structure, or business practices change such that the previous
firm-specific human capital is not applicable when this employee re-enters the firm.
There is a cutoff belief that a worker is good, q∗, such that the expected output on
level l and that on level m are equal. Note that the equal-productivity cutoff at an outside
firm is equal to the equal-productivity cutoff at an incumbent firm.6 q∗ solves q∗E lg +
(1− q∗)E lr = q∗Emg +(1− q∗)Emr , q∗ = (E lr −Emr )/[(Emg −Emr )− (E lg−E lr)]. Thus, if
the belief that a worker is good in period t is above this cutoff level, she is expected
to be more productive on the management job; otherwise, she is expected to be more
productive on the laborer job.
Following Greenwald (1986), I assume that a small fraction, λ , of workers leave the
incumbent firm for exogenous reasons in each period. The existence of exogenous job
switchers alleviates the winner’s curse problem as discussed in the previous section.7 I
consider equilibrium behavior when λ → 0.
To keep the model tractable, I focus on parameterizations that satisfy the following
two conditions.
(i) q∗ < qiT (1). This condition says that if worker i attains only one high productive
efficiency in any of the previous T−1 periods, she is more productive on the upper-level
job in period T . Therefore, there are no demotions in equilibrium.
6In general, if the firm-specific human capital term is not multiplicative in the production function, the
equal-productivity cutoff ability levels are different in an incumbent firm and in an outside firm.
7Note that the exogenous job-switching status is different in every period, i.e., an exogenous mover in
this period might not be an exogenous mover in the next period. As I will show, in equilibrium, there is no
turnover other than the exogenous job-movers. If the job-switching status is time-invariant, once a worker
moves, she reveals her true job-switching type such that the firm can separate the exogenous movers from
other workers perfectly. As a result, I would have the strong winner’s curse for the non-exogenous movers
at the beginning of period 3.
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(ii) S is “large”. In particular, I assume that S is large enough (the precise parameter
restriction can be found in the Appendix) that, in period T , the incumbent firm has an
incentive to assign a worker with only one high output realization up to period T −1 to
the upper level job. This condition guarantees that a worker is promoted when a high
productive efficiency is attained. It also means an incumbent firm’s belief about a non-
promoted worker’s ability type based on realized outputs is the same as an outside firm’s
belief about this worker’s ability type based on observed job assignments. It guarantees
that there is promotion in every period and there is no distortion in firms’ promotion
decisions.
Firms and workers are risk neutral and discount the future with a common discount-
ing factor β < 1. There is no cost to workers from changing firms or to firms from hiring
or firing workers. Under these assumptions, long-term contracts are not necessary, so I
consider equilibrium wages that are determined by spot-market contracts. At the begin-
ning of each period, firms engage in a wage-setting game where they place wage “bids”
in order to attract workers. That is, wages are promised before production begins in each
period.
The timing of the events is the following. At the beginning of period 1, nature moves
first to assign an ability type to each worker and this ability type is time invariant. Firms
make period-1 job assignments and wage offers conditional on their prior beliefs’ about
a worker being good. Workers choose the firm with the highest wage offer to work
at. At the end of period 1, incumbent firms privately observe workers’ outputs. At the
beginning of the next period, incumbent firms update their beliefs about workers’ ability
types and announce job assignment decisions for their previous period’s employees.
After outside firms observe these job assignment decisions, all firms make wage offers
simultaneously. Workers privately learn about their job-switching types in this period
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and the exogenous movers depart. Workers then choose the firm with the highest wage
offer to work at. If there are multiple firms offering the same highest wage, a worker
chooses randomly among those highest-wage-offer firms but stays with her previous
period’s employer if her previous period’s employer is one of the highest-wage-offer
firms. Production then begins. At the end of period 2, workers’ outputs are privately
observed by their incumbent firms. This process repeats until date T .
Firms’ strategies are sequences of job-assignment and wage-offer pairs. Let w jit
denote the wage offer to worker i in period t. Jit denotes the job assignment to worker
i in period t. In equilibrium, the incumbent firm anticipates that outside firms’ behavior
would be affected by its promotion decisions. The best response is to match the wage
offer from an outside firm and extract the rent created by the firm-specific human capital.
Therefore, the equilibrium wage offer from the incumbent firm is equal to the wage offer
from the outside firm and there is no turnover in equilibrium except for the exogenous
movers. A firm’s strategy set is
{
Jit ,w
j
it
}
t
, j = Jit ∈ {l,m}, t ∈ {1, . . . ,T}.
Figure 2.1 shows the sequences of beliefs, job assignments, and wage offers after
the incumbents observe the productive efficiencies of their own workers in each period.
2.4 The Analysis
In this section, I begin the analysis with a brief discussion about the equilibrium job
assignment rules and wage offers when a worker’s type is perfectly known. I then con-
sider what happens given asymmetric information and discuss the relationship between
non-promotion, negative signals, and wage dynamics.
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period 1 period 2 . . .
T
nature assigns
types; firms form
beliefs qi1 = p0
all firms make
job assign. Ji1;
offer wages wJi1i1
workers
pick offers
& produce
output yi1
observed
incumbent firms
update beliefs qINCi2 (yi1);
make job assign. Ji2
all firms offer
wages wJi2i2
exog.
movers
leave
workers
pick offers
& produce
output yi2
realized
Figure 2.1: Timing of the job-assignment-wage-offer game.
2.4.1 A Full-information model with T periods
Under full information, workers’ types are fully observed by all firms. Each firm’s prob-
lem is to assign workers to the jobs that maximize the total discounted profit. Firms solve
different problems when assigning workers who have worked for them in the previous
period and those who have not. This is because firms can collect firm-specific human
capital from the old workers in the current period but they have to train new workers.
Consider a firm’s problem when it assigns workers who were employed by the firm
in the previous period, i.e., when the firm makes job assignment decisions and wage
offers as an incumbent firm. Let ΠINCt (θi) denote the incumbent firm’s profit in period
t from employing a worker who has a probability θi of attaining the high productive
efficiency. Πlt(θi) is the non-promotion profit and Πmt (θi) is the promotion profit from
employing this worker. Then ΠINCt (θi) = max
{
Πlt(θi),Πmt (θi)
}
,8 where
8Since there is no turnover in equilibrium for non-exogenous movers and the probability of exogenous
moving approaches zero, firm-tenure is equal to their total labor market experience in t. Also, I only
have two job levels in the current set up. For those who are not promoted and who do not move to other
firms, their labor market experience, firm-tenure, and job-tenure are the same. For the promoted workers
in the period of promotion, their labor market experience, firm-tenure and job-tenure are also the same.
However, the negative signals are embedded in the job-tenure. I will discuss how to extend the framework
to distinguish between the three after I analyze the model.
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Πlt(θi) = (1+S)[θiz
l
H +(1−θi)zlL+ f (t−1)]−wlit +βΠINCt+1 (θi), (2.3)
Πmt (θi) = (1+S) [θiz
m
H +(1−θi)zmL + f (t−1)]−wmit +βΠINCt+1 (θi). (2.4)
w jt is the equilibrium wage that an incumbent firm offers, which is equal to outside
firms’ wage offer.9 In period t, the incumbent firm chooses a job-assignment-wage-offer
pair to maximize the total discounted profit given workers’ types. If non-promotion is
more profitable, the firm assigns the worker to the lower level job. Otherwise, the firm
assigns the worker to the upper-level job. Due to the firm-specific human capital, an
incumbent firm can potentially make positive profit by retaining an old worker.
When a firm makes decisions as an outside firm, i.e., when it considers wage bids
for workers in other firms, its problem is characterized by a zero profit condition (due to
free entry). Thus, the equilibrium wage in period t is equal to a worker’s current period’s
productivity plus potential discounted future profits at an outside firm, ΠOUTt+1 (θi), i.e.,
w jit(θi) = [θiz
j
H +(1−θi)z jL+ f (t−1)]+βΠOUTt+1 (θi), j ∈ {l,m},θi ∈ {θg,θr}. (2.5)
In the last period, since there are no future periods, a worker’s wage is equal to
her productivity in period T . In periods before T , a period-t “outside” firm would
become an “incumbent” firm from period t + 1 onward. This is because from period
t + 1 onward, a period-t outside firm starts to collect the firm-specific human capital
as a period-t incumbent firm does. Since a period-t outside firm has the same infor-
mation about a worker as a period-t incumbent firm does, the outside firm’s expected
future profit is equal to an incumbent firm’s expected future profit from period t+1, i.e.,
9The expressions in 2.3 and 2.4 describe equilibrium behavior. The original firms’ problem for this
wage-bidding Bertrand competition is that the incubent firm and the outside firms choose their own wages
holding other firms’ wage bids as fixed. In equilibrium, those wages are equal. I omit the original
expression to simplify the notation.
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ΠINCt+1 (θi) = Π
OUT
t+1 (θi) = Πt+1(θi). Thus, we can substitute (2.5) into (2.3) and (2.4),
and an incumbent’s job-assignment problem simplifies to
ΠINCt (θi) = S · { max
l,m
[θizlH +(1−θi)zlL,θizmH +(1−θi)zmL ]+ f (t−1)},θi ∈ {θg,θr}.
Since a good worker has higher expected productivity on the upper-level job and
an ordinary worker has higher expected productivity on the lower level job, the good
worker should be assigned to the upper-level job and the ordinary worker should be
assigned to the lower level job in each period. Also, since workers of the same type are
ex ante identical, the equilibrium wages are only functions of workers’ types, i.e., all
good workers are paid the same wage in a certain period while all ordinary workers are
paid another. I thus omit the individual subscript in the wage equations in the rest of this
section.
I summarize the job assignment rules and equilibrium wages under full information
in the following proposition. All proofs are provided in the appendix.
Proposition 3. Suppose each worker’s type is fully observable. Then the job assignment
rules and the equilibrium wages satisfy (i) and (ii):
(i) A good worker is assigned to the management level in every period and is paid
wmt (θg) = [Emg + f (t − 1)] + βS[Emg + f (t)] in period 1 ≤ t < T ; she is paid wmT (g) =
Emg + f (T −1) in period T ;
(ii) An ordinary worker is assigned to the laborer level in every period and is paid
wlt(θr) = [E lr + f (t − 1)] + βS[E lr + f (t)] in period 1 ≤ t < T ; she is paid wliT (r) =
E lr + f (T −1) in period T .
From Proposition 3, only the next period’s productivity matters for the equilibrium
wage. This is because the future profit is the extra economic rent that an incumbent
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firm can extract from collecting the benefit of one more period of firm-specific human
capital compared to an outside firm. Thus, the rent is the next period’s productivity
multiplied by the firm-specific human capital factor S. This rent gives an outside firm
an incentive to become an incumbent firm in the next period by bidding away a worker
in the current period. Since firms are competing with each other over workers, all the
economic rent is reflected in the equilibrium wage. The higher the firm-specific human
capital is, the more a firm is willing to pay in anticipation of a higher rent from collecting
the firm-specific part of the productivity.
Now let us consider how the timing of promotion is related to workers’ wages. An
ordinary worker’s wage growth on the laborer job between two periods is wlt+1(r)−
wlt(r) = [ f (t)− f (t− 1)]+βS[ f (t + 1)− f (t)] > 0. That is, a non-promoted worker’s
wage always increases with job tenure. A similar pattern is observed for good workers’
wages. The reason is that under full information there is no learning with additional
tenure, so workers’ wages are determined solely by human capital accumulation which
is non-decreasing with additional tenure. However, this prediction is inconsistent with
the finding in Baker et al.(1994a) that non-promoted workers’ wages first increase then
decrease with tenure on the same job level for workers who spend a long time on the
same job level. In the next section, I consider what happens when learning is asymmet-
ric. I show that with asymmetric learning, non-promotion interacts with human capital
accumulation and affects workers’ wage dynamics through learning.
2.4.2 A Model with Asymmetric Information
With asymmetric information, incumbent firms observe outputs and update their be-
liefs about a worker being good and then make job assignment decisions and wage
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offers based on observed outputs. Outside firms observe workers’ job assignments at
the incumbent firms and update beliefs about workers’ ability types. I focus on per-
fect Bayesian Equilibriums (PBE) of the model. That is, equilibrium beliefs are derived
based on Bayes’ rule given equilibrium strategies and equilibrium strategies are optimal
for the incumbent firms, the outside firms, and the workers given the equilibrium beliefs.
Under the current framework, the incumbent firm never learns workers’ true types.
Furthermore, because of the binary output structure, when the incumbents make promo-
tion announcements, they convey their private information about a worker’s output in
the current period completely under the parameterizations specified in the previous sec-
tion. That is, whenever an incumbent firm observes the high-level productive efficiency,
a worker is promoted; whenever an incumbent firm observes the low-level productive
efficiency, a worker stays on the same job level (a promoted worker stays on the up-
per level job). In anticipating these equilibrium strategies, an outside firm believes that
the high-level productive efficiency was attained at the laborer job when a promotion
is observed; while a low-level productive efficiency was attained if a non-promotion is
observed. It remains to check that under those beliefs the incumbents’ strategies are
indeed optimal.
The firms’ problem is similar to the one under full information, i.e., incumbent firms
choose a job-assignment-wage-offer pair to maximize total expected profit. The dif-
ference is that, since workers’ types are unknown, workers’ expected productivity is
determined by the belief that a worker is good. Let ΠINCt (qINCit ) denote the incum-
bent firm’s profit in period t from employing a worker who is believed (by the incum-
bent firm) to be good with probability qINCit . Π
l
t(q
INC
it ) is the non-promotion profit and
Πmt (qINCit ) is the promotion profit from employing this worker. Then Π
INC
t (q
INC
it ) =
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max
{
Πlt(qINCit ),Π
m
t (q
INC
it )
}
, where
Πlt(q
INC
it ) = (1+S)[q
INC
it E
l
g+(1−qINCit )E lr + f (t−1)]−wlit +βΠINCt+1 (qINCit , l), (2.6)
Πmt (q
INC
it ) = (1+S)[q
INC
it E
l
g+(1−qINCit )E lr + f (t−1)]−wmit +βΠINCt+1 (qINCit ,m).
(2.7)
ΠINCt+1 (q
INC
it , j), j ∈ {l,m}, is the incumbent’s future expected profit given the belief
in t that a worker is good with probability qINCit and the fact that the worker is assigned
to job j in period t.
The outside firms’ problem is characterized by a zero profit condition, so an outside
firm is willing to bid above a worker’s current period’s expected productivity because
it can collect future rents when it becomes an incumbent firm. Similar to the property
in the full information equilibrium, in determining wages, only the next period’s job
assignment and productivity are relevant to the expected rents because an incumbent
firm only collects one more period of firm-specific human capital compared to an outside
firm.
Outside firms’ wage bids are
wlit(q
OUT
it ) = [q
OUT
it E
l
g+(1−qOUTit )E lr + f (t−1)]+βΠOUTt+1 (qOUTit , l), (2.8)
wmit (q
OUT
it ) = [q
OUT
it E
l
g+(1−qOUTit )E lr + f (t−1)]+βΠOUTt+1 (qOUTit ,m), (2.9)
where qOUTit denotes the outside firm’s belief in period t that worker i is good;
ΠOUTt+1 (q
OUT
it , j) denotes the outside firm’s future expected profit given the belief in t
that a worker is good and the fact that the worker is assigned to job j in period t.
Note that under asymmetric information, an outside firm’s belief that a worker is
good is based on the incumbents’ job assignment signals while the incumbent’s belief
is based on workers’ output realizations. That is, an incumbent firm and an outside firm
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have different information sets about each worker. Thus, the outside firm’s belief about
the worker and the expected future rents from this worker might be different from the
incumbent firm’s. However, parameter restriction (ii) guarantees that the incumbent firm
promotes a worker when a high output is observed. Therefore, at the time of promotion,
the incumbent and the outside firms have the same information about a non-promoted
worker, i.e., qINCit = q
OUT
it = qit ,Π
INC
t+1 (q
INC
it , j) = Π
OUT
t+1 (q
OUT
it , j) = Πt+1(qit , j). Thus,
an incumbent’s job-assignment problem simplifies to
Πt [qit(ht−1i )] = S · max
l,m
{
E[ylit |qit(ht−1i )],E[ymit |qit(ht−1i )]
}
= S · max
l,m
{
qit(ht−1i )E
l
g+[1−qit(ht−1i )]E lr,qit(ht−1i )Emg +[1−qit(ht−1i )]Emr
}
+S · f (t−1).
Therefore, the equilibrium strategy is that if the belief of a worker being good is
greater than the threshold, i.e., qit ≥ q∗ (recall that q∗ equates the expected productivity
on the two job levels), the worker is promoted. Otherwise, the worker remains in the
previous job level. Given parameter restriction (i), once a high productive efficiency is
observed (for the first time), the belief of this worker being good would be above the
threshold and thus this worker will be promoted by an incumbent firm, i.e., since qit(1)>
qiT (1)> q∗, once a worker attains the high productive efficiency, she is assigned to the
manager position and remains there independent of subsequent output realizations.
At an outside firm, given the observed job assignment history, the expected future
profit to an outside firm is the same whether the worker is assigned to the manager posi-
tion or the laborer position in the current period. Thus, an outside firm only considers the
current period’s expected output when deciding where to assign a worker. If an outside
firm observes a promotion (non-promotion), it believes that this worker has produced
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high (low) output at the incumbent firm and thus she is more productive on the upper
(lower) level job in the current period. Therefore, a promoted (non-promoted) worker
at an incumbent firm is also assigned to the upper-level (lower-level) job at an outside
firm.
Let Et [Z
j
it |qit(ht−1i )] denote the part of the expected productivity in t that is de-
termined by workers’ ability types given the observed information up to t − 1, i.e.,
Et [Z
j
it |qit(ht−1i )] = qit(ht−1i )E jg + [1− qit(ht−1i )]E jr . Let Et [Z jit+1|qit(ht−1i ), j] denote the
part of the expected productivity in t +1 from period t’s perspective that is determined
by workers’ ability types given the observed information up to t−1 and the job assign-
ment in t. The expression for Et [Z
Jit+1
it+1 |qit(ht−1i ), j] is given in the appendix.
I summarize the job assignment rules and equilibrium wages under asymmetric in-
formation in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Suppose workers’ types are not observed but the incumbent firms can
observe workers’ outputs and the outside firms can observe workers’ job assignments.
Given the prior belief that a worker is good with probability p0, the job assignment rules
and the equilibrium wages satisfy (i) to (iv):
(i) All workers are assigned to the lower level job in period 1.
(ii) Let ti be the first period in which worker i produces the high output. Then worker
i is assigned to the laborer position in each period t, t ≤ ti. Her wage in t is wlit [qit(0)] =
{Et [Zlit |qit(0)]+ f (t−1)}+βS{Et [ZJit+1it+1 |qit(0), l]+ f (t)}.
(iii) Worker i is assigned to the manager position in each period t, ti + 1 ≤
t < T . Her wage in t is wmit [qiti+1(1)] = {Et [Zmit |qiti+1(1)] + f (t − 1)} + β{(1 +
S)Et [Z
Jit+1
it+1 |qiti+1(1),m]−Et [Zmit |qiti+1(1)]+S f (t)}.
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(iv) In period T , if ti ≤ T −1, the worker is assigned to the manager job and is paid
wmiT [qiti+1(1)] = E[Z
m
iT |qiti+1(1)]+ f (T −1); if ti > T −1, she is assigned to the laborer
job and is paid wliT [qiT (0)] = E[Z
l
iT |qiT (0)]+ f (T −1).
Note that for workers who have attained the high productive efficiency before period
T − 1, outside firms’ beliefs about their types stop updating once they are promoted
because outside firms cannot infer their outputs from job assignments anymore (see (iv
in Proposition 4). However, outside firms expect a promoted worker to produce either
high or low in the next period because there is no winner’s curse and incumbents do not
observe workers’ types perfectly. After a worker worked for a firm for one period, the
firm starts to collect new information about this worker. Thus, the expected rent derived
from employing this worker is the difference between the worker’s expected productivity
at an incumbent firm in the next period, (1+ S){Et [ZJit+1it+1 |qiti+1(1),m]+ f (t)}, and the
worker’s expected productivity at an outside firm in the next period, Et [Zmit |qiti+1(1)]+
f (t).
Now, let us consider how the non-promotion wages change with job-tenure. Note
that all workers with the same output history are ex ante identical (i.e., qit(0) =
qkt(0), i 6= k). That is, all the non-promoted workers in period t are paid the same wage.
In the following discussion, I omit the subscript i for individuals. The wage paid to a
worker who is on level l for t periods ( i.e. she has attained the low-level productive
efficiency in the previous t−1 periods) thus is wlt [qt(0)], and the wage paid to a worker
who is on level l for t + 1 periods ( i.e. she has attained the low-level of productive
efficiency in the previous t periods), is wlt+1[qt+1(0)].
Corollary 4. Under asymmetric information, there exists a t∗1 , 2 < t
∗
1 ≤ t¯ , such that
if the following conditions are satisfied, the non-promoted workers’ wages increase in
periods before t∗1 +1 and decrease in periods after t
∗
1 +1, i.e., for t < t
∗
1 +1, w
l
t [qt(0)]<
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wlt+1[qt+1(0)]; for t > t
∗
1 +1, w
l
t [qt(0)]> w
l
t+1[qt+1(0)] if
f (t∗1 +1)− f (t∗1)> [q2(1)−q3(1)][E lg−E lr], and (2.10)
f (t∗1 +2)− f (t∗1 +1)< [qt¯(1)−qt¯+1(1)][E lg−E lr].10 (2.11)
Corollary 4 says that when human capital accumulation exceeds the negative learn-
ing about workers’ ability with additional tenure, wages increase; when human capital
grows little between two periods, the negative learning about workers’ abilities lead to
a wage decrease.
To see how the conditions in (2.10) and (2.11) guarantee the wage patterns described
in Corollary 4, note that as additional low outputs are observed, the expectation that a
worker is good decreases, i.e., qt(0) > qt+1(0), for t ≥ 2. Since E lg > E lr, the part of
the wage that is related to workers’ ability types, Et [Zlt |qt(0)] = qt(0)E lg+[1−qt(0)]E lr,
decreases when firms put a smaller weight on the belief that a worker is good. Similarly,
the forward expectation, Et [Z
Jt+1
t+1 |qt(0), l], also decreases in t, because it is less likely that
a worker would produce high in the next period if she has produced more low outputs
in the past. Since both expectations are bounded, if there is substantial human capital
accumulation from period t to period t + 1, the non-promotion wage increases. If the
human capital accumulation from period t to period t +1 is sufficiently small, the non-
promotion wage decreases. By construction, since human capital accumulates very fast
when t approaches 1 and it almost stops growing after t¯, there exists at least one period
between period 2 (note that tenure in period 2 is equal to 1) and period t¯ + 1 such that
the non-promotion wage turns from increasing to decreasing.
Furthermore, the expectation about workers’ types decreases at a decreasing speed
and eventually approaches zero when t approaches ∞. Thus, the largest decrease in ex-
pectation is between period 2 and 3. On the other hand, human capital increases at a
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decreasing speed and eventually approaches zero when t approaches t¯ < ∞. Thus, the
largest increase in human capital after period t∗1 + 1 is f (t
∗
1 + 2)− f (t∗1 + 1). The con-
dition in (2.10) guarantees that in periods before t∗1 + 1 the smallest human capital ac-
cumulation outweighs the largest expectation decrease. Thus, workers’ wages increase
before period t∗1 + 1. After that, the condition in (2.11) guarantees that the largest hu-
man capital accumulation is smaller than the smallest expectation decrease. Therefore,
workers’ wages decrease after period t∗1 +1.
11
As graphed in Baker et al. (1994a), for workers who are promoted from level 1 to
level 2 within six years of tenure on level 1, their (real) wages prior to the promotion
increase with each additional year of job-level tenure. For workers who are promoted
after the sixth year, their wages prior to the promotion first increase then decrease with
additional level-1 tenure. This empirical finding departs from Bernhardt’s (1995) pre-
diction that the non-promotion wages either increase or decrease monotonically with
firm-level tenure but is captured in the above Corollary.
Using a similar argument, one can examine the wage-tenure relation for wages upon
promotion.
Corollary 5. Under asymmetric information, there exists a t∗2 , 3< t
∗
2 ≤ t¯ , such that if the
following conditions are satisfied, the promotion wages increase in periods before t∗2 +1
and decrease in periods after t∗2 +1, i.e., for 3≤ t < t∗2 +1, wmt [qt(1)]< wmt+1[qt+1(1)];
for t > t∗2 +1, w
m
t [qt(1)]> w
m
t+1[qt+1(1)] if
f (t∗2 +1)− f (t∗2)>
1+S
S
[q4(2)−q5(2)][E lg−E lr], and (2.12)
f (t∗2 +2)− f (t∗2 +1)< (1−β )[qt¯(2)−qt¯+1(2)][E lg−E lr]. (2.13)
11If the conditions in (2.10) and (2.11) are not satisfied, I still get the result that non-promoted workers’
wages increase when tenure is low and their wages eventually fall (after t¯ +1 for example). But I cannot
guarantee that the non-promotion wages only turn once from increasing to decreasing.
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Similar to the non-promotion wage, the wage in the period of promotion first in-
creases then decreases with more time spent on the lower level job before promotion.
Baker et al. (1994a) find that if a worker earns a promotion within four years on level 1,
the wage that she earns upon promotion is higher than the wage paid to someone who
is promoted in the previous period. On the other hand, if a worker earns a promotion
after spending more than four years on level 1, the wage that she earns upon promotion
is lower than the wage paid to someone who is promoted in the previous period.
Note that the condition in (2.12) is stronger than that in (2.10) since qt(2)−
qt+1(2)> qt(1)−qt+1(2)> qt(0)−qt+1(0). Therefore, it is possible that t∗2 < t∗1 , which
means the promotion wage falls before the non-promotion wage does.
It is worth noticing that the signaling effect is embedded in job-tenure rather than
firm-tenure. In the current set up, the level-l job-tenure is equal to firm-tenure before
promotion. Suppose I were to extend the model to include a level below the laborer’s
level, call it the routine level, where workers’ productivities do not vary with abilities
and workers in this level are randomly selected into the laborer’s level. If we compare a
worker who has eleven years of firm tenure with four years on the routine job and seven
years on the laborer’s job to a worker who has ten years of firm-tenure with two years
on the routine job and eight years on the laborer’s job, if both workers are not promoted
in the current period, the former would earn a higher wage than the latter although she
has longer firm-tenure. The latter has a lower wage because she spends more time on
the laborer’s position. That is, the negative signal is associated with job-tenure rather
than firm-tenure.
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2.5 Data and Tests
In Baker et al. (1994a), the wage-job-tenure profile is shown using a raw plot. In this
section, I use the same dataset that they have studied to estimate a tenure-wage equation
controlling for other observables. I focus on the relationship between job-tenure and
non-promotion wages as well as the relationship between job-tenure (before promotion)
and promotion wages.
Table 2.1: Levels, Titles, and Education
Level TITLE HS BS MA PHD Total
1 AH 80 78 16 7 181
N=4,699 44.2 43.09 8.84 3.87 100
Pct.=29.63% AJ 1,460 1,301 481 31 3,273
44.61 39.75 14.7 0.95 100
AK 766 402 77 0 1,245
61.53 32.29 6.18 0 100
2 H 59 73 20 17 169
N=5,399 34.91 43.2 11.83 10.06 100
Pct.=34.05% I 43 124 21 0 188
22.87 65.96 11.17 0 100
J 97 134 70 17 318
30.5 42.14 22.01 5.35 100
K 428 180 59 0 667
64.17 26.99 8.85 0 100
L 1,406 585 209 3 2,203
63.82 26.55 9.49 0.14 100
M 551 848 409 46 1,854
29.72 45.74 22.06 2.48 100
3 F 21 80 22 0 123
N=5,759 17.07 65.04 17.89 0 100
Pct.=36.32% G 2,327 1,905 1,056 105 5,393
43.15 35.32 19.58 1.95 100
SH 47 148 24 24 243
19.34 60.91 9.88 9.88 100
Total 7,285 5,858 2,464 250 15,857
45.94 36.94 15.54 1.58 100
The dataset was constructed by George Baker, Michael Gibbs, and Bengt Holmstrom
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from the personnel records of a medium-sized US firm in the financial services industry.
It contains detailed information on workers’ demographic characteristics, tenure, sub-
jective performance evaluation, and promotion history. In their seminal papers, Baker et
al. (1994a;b) provide a thorough analysis of wage and career dynamics in this firm dur-
ing a 20-year period from 1969 to 1988 using the full sample of managerial employees
for a total of 68,437 employee-year data points. In this analysis, I restrict the sample to
US white males to focus on the wage dynamics without concerning the gender-wage-
gap. I also exclude demotion, which takes up 2%-3% of the sample. Since I use a
one-year lag in calculating job-tenure, I exclude the entry cohort ’69. I also exclude
any data points with missing performance measure and I exclude years of schooling
15,17,19, and 20 since those years of schooling are hard to categorize with a degree
measure. There are eight job levels, where level 8 is the CEO position.12 I only look
at workers on levels 1 to 3 since the promotion and wage dynamics on upper-level jobs
might be very different from those on lower level jobs. Moreover, I want to focus my
analysis on the same sample that generates the wage plots in Baker et al. (1994a). In
those plots, they focus on the wage and job-tenure relations on level 1 through level 3.
This sample selection procedure gives me a sample of 15,857 employee-year data points
across three job levels.
Table 2.1 presents the 17 major job titles as specified in Baker et al. (1994a;b),
grouped by job levels and interacted with education groups following DeVaro and Wald-
man (2012). Observations are roughly equally distributed across three job levels, with
30% from level 1, 34% from level 2, and 36% from level 3. There are 12 job titles
on level 1 to 3 but there are one or two job titles that are the dominant job title on a
particular level.
Table 2.2 presents the descriptive statistics. Supervisor subjective performance rat-
12See Baker et al. (1994a;b) for detail descriptions about how the job levels are constructed.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Real Salary (in 1988 dollar) 15857 46726.37 10483.57 20846.91 109890.10
∆Real Salary 11859 1644.12 3047.10 -13522.83 30163.46
∆% Real Salary 11859 0.04 0.07 -0.24 0.91
Age 15857 39.03 9.43 23.00 69.00
High School 15857 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00
Bachelor 15857 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00
Master 15857 0.16 0.36 0.00 1.00
PhD 15857 0.02 0.12 0.00 1.00
Performance Rating (t-1) 11859 1.95 0.71 1.00 5.00
Year at Company (t-1) 13372 3.74 3.51 0.00 18.00
Year at Level (t-1) 15086 2.60 2.56 0.00 17.00
Promotion 15857 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00
ings are measured annually on a five-point scale where 1 denotes the best performance
and 5 the worst. There are roughly equal numbers of employee-years in the three job
levels. The average tenure at the firm is 3.7 years and the average tenure in the job level
is 2.6 years. Workers on average spend 2.3 years on level 1 before being promoted to
level 2. They spend a little longer, 2.6 years, on level 2 before being promoted to level
3. Around 15% of the employees are promoted in each sample year.
To test the job-tenure-wage profile, I consider the following wage equation.
wit = β0+β1Lit−1+β2Wi0+β3Xit−1+ εit (2.14)
i indexes an individual and t indexes years. Xit−1 is a vector of controls including age
and age squared, education, and performance rating in the previous year. Lit−1 is year
at level in t− 1 before promotion. Thus, it denotes the job-level tenure at the previous
level for a just promoted worker and job-level tenure at the current level up to t − 1
for a non-promoted worker. Wi0 is worker i’s first salary at the firm, which is a control
for workers’ initial characteristics (Belzil et al., 2012). Workers’ initial characteristics
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need to be controlled for because the model predictions concern learning about ex ante
identical workers. Since the initial wage carries rich information about an individual, I
use it as a proxy for workers’ initial heterogeneity.
Table 2.3: Wage-tenure profile before promotion (quadratic): level=1
(1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) OLS (5) FE
Dependent Variable: Real Salary in 88 Dollars
Yr. at Level 80.128 1,120.291** 771.463** 1,256.270** 1,002.114**
(t-1) (53.370) (111.222) (124.559) (214.247) (127.373)
Yr at Level2 -135.559** -99.508** -112.916** -79.256**
(t-1) (12.083) (12.466) (17.230) (10.237)
Entry Salary 0.328** 0.328** 0.313** 0.353**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.024)
Rating (t-1) -2,333.563**
(244.979)
Age (t-1) 1,170.840** 889.369** 1,905.166**
(87.675) (137.627) (254.780)
Age2(t-1) -14.225** -11.218** -24.356**
(1.071) (1.593) (2.885)
High School -307.858 -827.032*
(250.931) (354.364)
Master 3,649.813** 2,721.757**
(349.193) (612.507)
PhD 2,863.510** 1,972.203
(890.531) (1,145.488)
Constant 31,559.206** 30,848.928** 8,778.494** 18,337.007** 3,235.066
(341.818) (346.468) (1,642.439) (2,709.431) (5,608.402)
Observations 4,516 4,516 4,516 2,338 4,518
R-squared 0.147 0.166 0.223 0.237 0.954
Robust standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
The sample that I use to test the non-promotion-wage-job-tenure relation is restricted
to those individuals who are on the same job level in a particular year and I consider
individuals on different job levels separately. The sample that I use to test the promotion-
wage-job-tenure relation is restricted to those individuals who are just promoted in a
particular year and I consider the individuals who are promoted from level 1 to level 2
and those who are promoted from level 2 to level 3 separately.
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Table 2.3 looks at the relationship between job-tenure and non-promotion wages (in
real terms) for those individuals on level 1. The table begins with the most parsimo-
nious specification with only job-tenure in the previous period and the entry salary as
the explanatory variables in Column (1). There is a positive relationship between wage
and job-tenure but it is not statistically significant. Each column from (2) to (4) adds
additional controls. Column (2) adds a quadratic term for job-tenure. Column (3) in-
cludes controls for age and education. Column (4) adds controls for performance rating.
The hump-shaped wage-job-tenure relation remains after I control for performance rat-
ing. However, in the theoretical model workers’ wages are not conditioned on their
performance, so column (3) is a better test of the theory. In Column (5), I consider a
fixed-effect model on individual level excluding performance ratings. The relationship
between job-tenure and the non-promoted workers’ wage persists regardless of model
specifications. In particular, the non-promoted workers’ wage first increases then starts
to fall. These results match Baker et al.’s (1994a) wage plots very well.
Note that, the OLS models compare the average wages across individuals and the
fixed-effect model captures within person wage dynamics. From the theoretical model,
all the non-promoted workers in a given period are paid the same wage because they
are identical in all other dimensions. In practice, workers differ in age, education, per-
formances and other dimensions. Therefore, I control for other observables in the OLS
models. However, there might still be other unobserved individual characteristics that
are driving the results. So the estimates of the OLS models capture two effects. First,
those individuals who stay on level 1 for a shorter period of time on average earn a
higher wage than those who stay longer because the former are more able to earn a
promotion earlier. Second, each individual has a smaller wage increase (and eventually
wage decrease) with longer tenure on the same level. The theoretical model suggests that
we should also observe the hump-shaped wage-tenure pattern when we compare within
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individuals and these predictions are supported by the estimates from the fixed-effect
model.13
Table 2.4 examines the job-tenure-non-promotion-wage relation using job-tenure
dummies instead of imposing the quadratic form on job-tenure in the wage equation.
We can see that the non-promoted workers’ wages increase with job-tenure then start to
fall after four or five years. For example, from Column (1), with three year tenure on job
1, a worker’s wage is $1,969 higher than the entry wage; with four year tenure on job 1,
a worker’s wage is only $1,544 higher than the entry wage, which means the worker’s
wage starts to fall in the fourth year. If a worker spends more than six years on level 1
without a promotion, her wage even falls below the entry level. These patterns remain
after I control for age and education in Column (2). In Column (3), I add controls for
performance rating. The wage pattern remains. Column (4) presents the fixed-effect
estimates with job-tenure dummies. We can see that workers wages increase fast in the
first five years on the job and starts to fall in the sixth year.
Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 repeat the analyses in Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 for workers
who stay on level 2. The hump-shape wage-tenure profile is still evident in both specifi-
cations with either a quadratic term on year-at-level or job-tenure dummies. Column (4)
in each table controls for age, education and performance rating. Column (5) considers
a fixed-effect model. From the fixed-effect model, the non-promotion wage on level 2
starts to fall in year 5.
Note that I do not control for firm tenure for the non-promoted workers for two
reasons. First, for individuals who are on level 1, their firm tenure is equal to their
13There is a discrepancy between the theory and the empirical specification in (2.14) that in the theory
workers only differ in their time-to-promotion. That is, all workers with the same job assignment history
are paid the same wage. As discussed in Gibbons and Waldman (1999a), one way to enrich the model is
to include different observed education levels such that workers with the same job assignment history are
paid differently.
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Table 2.4: Wage-tenure profile before promotion (year dummies): level=1
(1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) FE
Yr at Level(t-1) Dependent Variable: Real Salary in 88 Dollars
1 1,327.494** 850.815** -677.111 1,193.591**
(289.458) (286.645) (353.374) (141.784)
2 1,603.746** 784.368* 407.647 2,138.382**
(357.945) (377.822) (344.477) (223.858)
3 1,969.184** 1,010.640* 800.016 2,845.665**
(470.574) (500.490) (457.721) (328.424)
4 1,544.368** 530.355 526.257 3,057.691**
(544.806) (569.671) (535.426) (388.907)
5 716.288 -267.627 188.531 3,398.000**
(643.595) (660.488) (626.804) (494.805)
6 -325.991 -1,109.076 -127.689 3,224.353**
(780.660) (813.315) (753.214) (601.316)
7 -944.832 -1,641.365 -850.610 3,142.963**
(989.624) (977.187) (922.020) (755.284)
8 -4,072.561** -4,371.377** -3,399.209** 2,132.144*
(1,096.801) (1,089.629) (1,072.734) (877.605)
9 -4,696.114** -5,248.299** -4,232.494** 2,884.836**
(1,485.813) (1,480.712) (1,419.875) (1,084.924)
10 -6,822.486** -6,992.827** -5,512.765** 3,278.206*
(1,876.262) (1,573.646) (1,565.759) (1,424.512)
11 -4,745.591 -5,859.753* -4,843.347 2,259.449
(3,485.411) (2,812.724) (2,894.402) (1,975.629)
12 -6,727.453** -6,466.210** -5,047.442** 1,521.800
(807.280) (1,284.532) (1,300.991) (1,391.815)
13 -7,321.807** -6,495.907** -5,126.091** 1,897.945
(913.263) (1,207.943) (1,206.696) (1,656.205)
Entry Salary 0.327** 0.313** 0.354** No
(0.014) (0.014) (0.024) No
Age No Yes Yes Yes
Education No Yes Yes No
Rating No No Yes No
Constant 38,402.605** 13,989.254** 24,168.928** 7,151.725
(175.917) (1,729.504) (3,103.598) (5,009.659)
Observations 4,518 4,518 2,338 4,518
R-squared 0.026 0.097 0.107 0.954
Robust standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Table 2.5: Wage-tenure profile before promotion(quadratic): level=2
(1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) OLS (5) FE
Dependent Variable: Real Salary in 88 Dollars
Yr. at Level -20.267 1,084.606** 733.951** 913.175** 454.667**
(t-1) (34.432) (128.834) (146.204) (166.053) (88.055)
Yr at Level2 -88.054** -59.899** -46.615** -50.066**
(t-1) (9.830) (10.967) (13.778) (6.686)
Entry Salary 0.308** 0.338** 0.317** 0.373**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.016)
Rating (t-1) -2,361.349**
(181.537)
Age (t-1) 1,179.609** 1,117.072** 2,388.337**
(91.296) (101.540) (220.122)
Age2(t-1) -13.988** -13.186** -25.694**
(1.078) (1.179) (2.488)
High School -801.273** -791.539**
(265.289) (283.761)
Master 3,055.688** 2,475.624**
(342.154) (378.475)
PhD 1,960.592* 1,313.417
(944.297) (1,115.009)
Constant 37,490.788** 35,143.455** 12,620.226** 16,757.512** -7,025.540
(317.198) (425.766) (1,764.041) (1,980.936) (4,636.120)
Observations 4,574 4,574 4,574 3,779 5,141
R-squared 0.111 0.127 0.174 0.199 0.930
Robust standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
job tenure. Second, for a non-promoted worker on level 2, conditional on firm tenure,
those who have longer level-2 tenure in general should have shorter level-1 tenure. If
more able workers are promoted earlier on level 1, those individuals who have longer
level-2 tenure should earn a higher wage. On the other hand, long tenure on level 2
sends a negative signal. So, holding firm tenure fixed, the theory predicts that wages
can either increase or decrease with job tenure on level 2. The current specification
without controlling for firm tenure examines the average effect of level-2 tenure on
wages allowing individuals to have different years of tenure on level 1.
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Table 2.6: Wage-tenure profile before promotion(year dummies): level=2
(1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) FE
Yr at Level(t-1) Dependent Variable: Real Salary in 88 Dollars
1 3,642.644** 2,721.035** - 2,237.414**
(596.568) (544.034) - (335.115)
2 4,056.761** 2,868.391** 778.697* 2,414.836**
(620.571) (586.657) (330.145) (364.138)
3 4,151.822** 2,798.967** 1,098.994** 2,829.843**
(656.452) (633.962) (395.853) (378.361)
4 4,976.847** 3,474.826** 2,227.494** 2,888.903**
(706.598) (692.060) (484.368) (409.393)
5 5,318.720** 3,808.978** 2,861.933** 2,760.834**
(764.215) (759.700) (573.743) (439.888)
6 5,472.409** 3,956.963** 2,869.221** 2,241.372**
(873.991) (861.200) (681.666) (496.213)
7 6,864.477** 5,570.411** 4,544.755** 2,363.988**
(1,089.764) (1,059.840) (909.445) (622.746)
8 4,548.405** 3,488.197** 2,876.764** 1,170.001
(1,075.865) (1,043.605) (913.311) (667.476)
9 4,452.337** 3,531.212** 2,737.820** -37.641
(1,073.098) (1,079.420) (913.661) (729.459)
10 2,998.101** 2,133.263 1,864.390 -1,141.041
(1,162.290) (1,244.446) (1,069.091) (815.523)
11 4,278.598** 3,146.789* 2,939.162* -797.063
(1,457.885) (1,494.909) (1,360.042) (917.085)
12 5,437.926** 4,927.277* 4,471.845* -815.763
(2,057.511) (2,145.260) (2,036.756) (1,153.356)
13 1,343.494 876.404 4,195.668** -488.140
(711.369) (657.982) (1,034.647) (454.285)
Entry Salary 0.345** 0.324** 0.373** No
(0.013) (0.013) (0.016) No
Age No Yes Yes Yes
Education No Yes Yes No
Rating No No Yes No
Constant 42,978.276** 17,113.012** 22,109.807** -7,541.936
(570.767) (1,696.482) (1,956.427) (4,714.525)
Observations 5,141 5,141 4,235 5,141
R-squared 0.011 0.069 0.079 0.932
Robust standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Table 2.7 examines the average wages in the year of promotion for workers with
different job-tenure on the lower level job before promotion. Columns (1) and (2) con-
sider the promotion wage when a worker is promoted from level 1 to level 2. From
Column (1), the promotion wage first increases then decreases with tenure on the job
before promotion but the estimates are not statistically significant. From Column (2),
the promotion wage increases when tenure on the previous job is low and decreases with
tenure on the previous job is high but the relationship flips signs several times. From
Corollary 5, the promotion wage may change signs multiple times if the conditions in
(2.13) and (2.13) are not satisfied. Thus, these wage patterns are not inconsistent with
the model.
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 2.7 look at the promotion wage when a worker is
promoted from level 2 to level 3. Overall, if a worker spends less time on level 2 before
she is promoted, she earns a higher wage upon promotion. We do not observe the
promotion wage increase when the job-tenure on level 2 is low. As I discussed in the
theoretical analysis, under certain parameterization, it is possible that the promotion
wage falls when the non-promotion wage is still increasing because the promotion wage
is more sensitive to learning.
In summary, the empirical evidence supports the model’s prediction about the non-
promoted workers’ wages and job-tenure. Job-tenure not only affects workers’ human
capital levels but also carries rich information about workers’ unobserved ability. As
discussed in Gibbs (1995), job tenure can be used as a proxy for workers’ unobserved
ability.
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Table 2.7: Promotion Wage and Job Tenure Before Promotion
level 1 to level 2 level 2 to level 3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Real Salary in 88 Dollars
Year at Level (t-1) 339.530 -380.067
(448.027) (465.726)
Year at Level Sq. (t-1) -21.349 27.759
(55.417) (46.083)
Year at Level (t-1)
2 -143.129 -856.522
(509.929) (647.654)
3 -162.140 39.202
(656.884) (869.102)
4 1,252.088 -1,354.274
(898.077) (1,098.808)
5 814.904 606.428
(1,310.348) (1,646.929)
6 2,086.035 -1,271.724
(1,401.184) (1,590.442)
7 92.246 -4,181.807*
(2,003.750) (1,834.913)
8 1,140.458 5,537.766
(1,817.991) (3,156.209)
9 -2,937.925** -4,234.630**
(1,030.795) (1,420.881)
10 2,671.382 -3,086.256*
(5,183.328) (1,243.448)
11 -7,249.871** -
(661.319) -
12 - 5,727.921**
- (1,374.278)
Entry Salary 0.335** 0.336** 0.315** 0.312**
(0.026) (0.026) (0.030) (0.031)
Age Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 17,521.364** 17,164.737** 26,881.535** 26,979.739**
(3,334.137) (3,448.835) (4,731.407) (4,881.879)
Observations 1,170 1,170 910 910
R-squared 0.173 0.178 0.168 0.181
Robust standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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2.6 Conclusion
This essay develops a theoretical framework to explore the negative signals associated
with non-promotion. It contributes to the literature in three different ways. First, it
fills a gap in the learning literature by capturing the negative signaling role of non-
promotion. Second, this essay emphasizes the relationship between wages and job-level
tenure instead of firm-level tenure. Third, it provides a systematic explanation for a set
of empirical findings that are not well captured in existing models. My model shows
that non-promoted workers’ wages decrease when they spend a long time on the same
job level, while their wages increase in the early years on the job. The empirical tests
show clear evidence for a hump-shaped wage-job-tenure profile for the non-promoted
workers. These results suggest that, besides determining workers’ levels of human cap-
ital, job tenure carries additional information about individuals’ unobserved ability. The
trade-off between negative learning and positive human capital accumulation associated
with additional tenure shapes the wage-job-tenure profile.
There are a number of ways to extend the model. First, there is no turnover in this
model except for the exogenous movers. If workers are fully aware of the negative
signals associated with non-promotion, they may choose to leave before the negative
signals about their abilities are revealed through non-promotion. Second, I can allow
for heterogeneity in the initial human capital stock by incorporating education. The
strength of the negative signals is expected to be different for workers with different
initial levels of human capital.
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CHAPTER 3
FLATTENING FIRMS AND WAGE DISTRIBUTION
3.1 Introduction
Firms organize their workers into hierarchies to carry out production (Williamson, 1967;
Calvo and Wellisz, 1979; Rosen, 1982). The hierarchical structure of firms is closely
related to individuals’ career and wage dynamics. In the past thirty years, firms became
flatter, i.e., they got rid of some layers in their corporate hierarchy. This delayering trend
is well documented in numerous studies using large-scale firm-level data sets from sev-
eral developed countries (Colombo and Delmastro, 1999;2008; Rajan and Wulf, 2006;
Caliendo et al., 2012). Widely identified and most convincing causes of this trend are the
increased competition in the product market (Bloom et al., 2010; Guadalupe and Wulf,
2010), the improvement in corporate governance, and the advancement of information
technology (Garicano, 2000; Bresnahan et al., 2002).
While the causes of this delayering trend are extensively studied, the consequences
of this change, especially the impact on individuals’ wages and the wage distribution
within a firm, are not well explored.1 In this essay, I build a model to explain two
empirical regularities found in the recent literature. First, after firms delayer, wages at
all levels increase (Bauer and Bender, 2001; Rajan and Wulf, 2006; Caliendo et al.,
2012). Second, after delayering, the wage distribution becomes more unequal (Bauer
and Bender, 2001).
To explain these wage patterns associated with delayering, I consider a job-
1Numerous studies in the management and human resource literature explore the relationship between
firm delayering and subsequent firm performance. The conclusion is mixed. For example, Carzo and
Yanouzas (1969) find that tall organizations are more profitable, while Shaw and Schneier (1993), Cristini
et al. (2003), and Kuhn (2011) find that the opposite is true.
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assignment model with slot constraints and asymmetric information. In this set up,
workers compete for a single position at the upper level. Outside firms do not observe
workers’ outputs but can make inferences about workers’ abilities using promotions as
signals (Waldman, 1984a). In addition, I assume that workers sometimes leave their
positions for exogenous reasons following Greenwald (1986). The main intuition in this
model is that, holding firm size constant, the contestants’ pool is larger in a flatter firm
than in the firm with more layers. Therefore, winning a promotion in a flatter firm sends
a more positive signal about the winner’s ability.2 In addition, losing a promotion in a
larger contest sends a more positive signal about losers’ abilities as well. This is be-
cause losing a larger contest does not necessarily mean that a worker is incompetent but
rather that she is not the best among many workers. Thus, after delayering, wages at all
levels go up. In addition, because the market expectation about the winner’s ability goes
up faster than the market expectation about losers’ abilities, the wage gap between the
winner and the losers widens after delayering.
Three key features of the model are essential to the resulting wage patterns. First,
there is asymmetric learning among firms about workers’ abilities. With asymmetric
learning, workers’ wages are determined by their “market value”, which is based on their
job assignments. Second, the upper level positions are characterized by a slot constraint.
Without a slot constraint, after delayering, there would be an upward adjustment in the
expectation about the workers’ ability at the low level job and a non-upward adjustment
in the expectation about the workers’ ability at the upper-level job so that the wage
distribution would become more equal.3 Third, due to the existence of exogenous job
2This argument is related to discussions in Prendergast (1999) and Waldman (2013).
3For example, suppose there are three types of workers with high, regular, or low ability working for
a three-layer firm. The high ability individual is at the top, the regular ability individual is in the middle,
and the low ability individual is at the bottom. After delayering, since the regular worker is not good
enough for the top level job, she would join the low ability worker on the low level job. As a result, the
average ability at the top is unchanged while the average ability at the bottom rises. Suppose there is a
continuum of workers’ types, some middle level workers would join the top level job, and some middle
level workers would join the bottom level job. As a result, the average ability at the top falls while the
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movers, my model alleviates the “winner’s curse” problem that is common in models
with asymmetric information (Milgrom and Oster, 1987). Without exogenous movers,
if a worker is not promoted, the market would not want to offer a wage that is higher
than the lowest expected productivity. If a worker’s previous employer learns her ability
perfectly after one period as assumed in Waldman (1984a) and Zabojnik and Bernhardt
(1995), this lowest expected productivity does not change and so delayering would not
affect the wage for low level workers.
This essay contributes to the literature in several different ways. First, it contributes
to the delayering literature by exploring the effects of delayering on wage changes.
Second, it contributes to the job assignment literature by considering how firms’ orga-
nization structure affects wages. This essay also captures several empirical findings that
are not well explained in the existing literature.
The organization of this essay is as follows. In Section 2, I review related literature.
Section 3 discusses the model set up. In Section 4, I first analyze a model with two
layers, and then compare the results to a three-layer model. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
As I discussed in the introduction, most of the empirical literature on delayering has fo-
cused on the causes of delayering (Garicano, 2000; Bresnahan et al., 2002; Bloom et al.,
2010; Guadalupe and Wulf, 2010). Several recent studies have documented some new
wage patterns related to firm delayering. For example, using data from more than 300
US firms from 1986-1998, Rajan and Wulf (2006) find that after delayering, the division
average ability at the bottom rises. Since workers’ wages are largely attached to their expected ability
(productivity), wages in the firm become more equal.
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managers are paid more in salary and bonus after controlling for firm size and firm fixed
effects. Internationally, using a comprehensive sample of French manufacturing firms,
Caliendo et al. (2012) find that after delayering, wages at all levels of the firm increases.
In an earlier study using a nationally representative linked employer-employee panel
dataset from Germany, Bauer and Bender (2001) find that average wages increase after
firms delayer. The wage distribution also becomes more unequal.
Two existing theories have addressed the relationship between delayering and wage
distributions within firms. The first stream of literature is based on the command-and-
control argument. Qian (1994) extends Calvo and Wellisz (1979) by endogenizing the
number of layers in a hierarchy. The main mechanism is that since the entrepreneur’s
attention is limited, the further down a worker is in the hierarchy, the looser the control is
and the lower the worker’s effort is. Since the optimal number of layers decreases as the
capital stock shrinks, workers who remain in the same position relative to the bottom
receive a higher wage due to an increase in control with a shorter chain-of-command
and workers who remain in the same position relative to the top receive a lower wage
due to a decrease in monitoring with a larger span. That is, delayering is associated
with a wage increase at the lower level and a wage decrease at the top. This prediction is
inconsistent with the recent findings in the delayering literature and the more established
stylized fact that the CEO-to-average-wage ratio has increased dramatically over the past
thirty years.4
The other strand of literature takes the knowledge hierarchy approach (Garicano,
2000). Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) study a model in which firms eliminate
layers in response to negative demand shocks. Since the total knowledge for production
is unchanged, as the number of layers decreases, the knowledge and thus wages in all
4For example, Murphy and Zabojnik (2004) find that from 1970 to 2000, the ratio of CEO cash com-
pensation to average pay for production workers increased from 25 to 2000.
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pre-existing layers rise. In another study, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) consider
a model with homogeneous firms and heterogeneous workers. In their model, as the
cost of acquiring knowledge decreases, fewer layers are preferred and managers acquire
more knowledge. Since the knowledge increases more at the top, the overall wage in-
equality increases. While Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) provide an explanation
for why wages at all levels increase after delayering, they do not explain why wage in-
equality rises after delayering. On the other hand, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006)
explain why wage inequality rises after delayering, but they do not explain why wages at
all levels increase after delayering. My analysis captures both wage patterns associated
with delayering under a single theoretical framework.
My model is built on the promotion-as-signal approach found initially in Waldman
(1984a).5 Using this approach, Waldman (1984a) and various extensions capture many
stylized facts about wage and promotion dynamics, such as large wage increases upon
promotion (Bernhardt, 1995) and the wage-and-firm-size effect (Zabojnik and Bern-
hardt, 2001), etc. This paper adds to the promotion-as-signal literature by looking at the
effect of delayering on wages.
This model’s set up is closely related to Zabojnik and Bernhardt (2001). Zabojnik
and Bernhardt (2001) consider a model with slot constraints to explore the firm-wage-
size relation. The main focus in their model is on how promotion can induce optimal
human capital investment. In this paper, on the other hand, I explore the implications
of slot constraints and firms’ hierarchical structural changes on wage distributions. I
also show that, different from the prediction in Zabojnik and Bernhardt (2001), more
5The promotion-as-signal approach assumes asymmetric learning in the labor market which means a
worker’s current employer knows more about the worker’s true ability than outside firms do. A competing
modeling framework is to assume symmetric learning where all firms have the same information about a
worker’s type (Harris and Holmstrom, 1982; Gibbons and Waldman, 1999). Although both frameworks
can explain various stylized facts concerning wage and promotion dynamics inside firms, many recent
empirical studies have found evidence in favor of the asymmetric learning framework (Pinkston, 2009;
DeVaro and Waldman, 2012; Kahn, 2013). I thus adopt the asymmetric learning framework in this essay.
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efficient firms are not necessarily larger when we take into account the internal structure
of the firm.
3.3 The Model
In this section I set up a two-period model. There are F(> 2) identical firms in the mar-
ket. Each firm hires n risk-neutral young workers in period 1 (and firms can choose to
vary their sizes in period 2). Different jobs in a firm have different production efficien-
cies, denoted by V . The production efficiency translates workers’ ability into output.
Workers are ex ante identical and have two-period careers. I refer to an individual in
her first work period as young, and those who are in their second work period as old.
Worker i’s ability, θi, is drawn from a uniform distribution on [θL,θH ].
An individual with ability θ who is assigned to a job with production efficiency V
produces stVθ units of output in period t. st = S > 1 for an old worker who remains
at her previous period’s employer and st = 1 for a young worker or for an old worker
who just starts to work for a new firm. st thus captures firm specific human capital. The
total production at each firm is the sum of each worker’s output. I refer to a worker’s
previous period’s employer as the incumbent firm and all other firms as outside firms.
I assume there is over-supply of labor in the economy meaning that there are more
than n ·F workers. All the workers who are not hired by the firms stay self-employed.
Following Waldman and Zax (2013), I assume that there is learning-by-doing in self-
employment: a worker in her first period of self-employment produces U¯1 and a worker
in her second period of self-employment produces U¯2, where U¯2 > U¯1. If a worker works
for a firm in period 1 and becomes self-employed in period 2, she can only produce U¯1
in period 2. I assume SVθL > U¯1, which means working for a firm in period 2 is better
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than self-employment if a worker has worked for a firm in period 1. This condition
guarantees that workers do not change from working for a firm to self-employment
between two periods. Furthermore, I assume U¯1 +U¯2 > (1+ S)V E(θ), where E(θ) is
the unconditional mean of a worker’s ability. This condition guarantees that a firm hires
a finite number of workers. This is because if firms hire an infinite number of workers,
the total expected productivity and thus wage pay of each worker is (1+ S)V E(θ). If
this value is smaller than workers’ total income from self-employment for two periods,
U¯1 + U¯2, no worker would choose employment at a firm over self-employment. This
regulates the firms not to hire an infinite number of workers.
Following Greenwald (1986), I assume a small probability, λ , that workers leave the
firm for exogenous reasons. I consider the equilibrium behavior where λ → 0. In addi-
tion, I assume that the firm-specific human capital is sufficiently large that an incumbent
worker is always more productive than an outside worker.
The timing of the events is the following. At the beginning of period 1, nature as-
signs an ability type to each worker. Firms decide the optimal number of young workers
to hire and offer wages accordingly. Workers choose the firm with the highest wage
offer to work at. At the end of period 1, incumbent firms privately observe workers’ out-
puts. At the beginning of period 2, incumbent firms update their beliefs about workers’
types and one of the young workers is chosen to fill the upper level position if there is a
vacancy at the upper level. Outside firms observe the incumbent firms’ job assignment
decisions and update their belief about workers’ types. All firms then make wage offers
simultaneously. Workers privately learn about their job-switching types and the exoge-
nous movers depart. Workers then choose the firm with the highest wage offer to work
at for period 2. If there are multiple firms offering the same highest wage, a worker
chooses randomly among those highest-wage-offer firms but stays with her incumbent
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firm if her incumbent firm is one of the highest-wage-offer firms.
3.4 The Analysis
In equilibrium, firms assign workers to jobs and offer wages accordingly. I focus on
the perfect Bayes-Nash equilibrium of this game. I first discuss equilibrium behavior in
a two-layer firm and then I discuss and compare equilibrium behavior in a three-layer
firm. Both models are solved by backward induction.
3.4.1 A two-layer model
Let us first consider the wage setting process in a two-layer firm. A two-layer firm
consists of a CEO position (E) at the upper level and a number of laborer positions (L)
at the lower level. Let V j, j ∈ {E,L} denote the production efficiency in job j. I assume
V E > V L, which means the upper-level jobs have greater marginal returns to ability as
in Sattinger (1975) and Rosen (1982).
In period 1, n young workers are hired into the laborer positions in each firm. In
period 2, when the workers are old, one of them will be chosen to fill the CEO position
(the CEO position remains unfilled in the first period). Since V E > V L, firms always
have an incentive to assign the highest ability worker to the CEO position because this
worker has the largest output increase if placed in the CEO position instead of a laborer
position. In addition, due to the firm specific human capital, an incumbent firm can
extract the highest rent from placing the most able worker in the CEO position.
In period 2, after observing a young worker’s job assignment at her incumbent firm,
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outside firms form expectations about the worker’s ability. Denote the expected ability
of the promoted worker (i.e., the tournament winner) θE(n) and the expected ability of
a non-promoted worker (i.e., a tournament loser) θL(n). Then θE(n) = E(θi|i is the best
among n laborers) and θL(n) = E(θi|i is not the best among n laborers). Note that the
expected ability is a function of the number of contestants in the promotion tournament
only. W E(V,n) denotes the wage of the tournament winner who is promoted to the CEO
position. W L(V,n) denotes the wage of the laborers who do not win the tournament.
Proposition 5 describes the wages for the old workers in a two-layer firm. All proofs are
reserved for the Appendix.
Proposition 5. In equilibrium, an old worker’s wage is equal to her expected pro-
ductivity at an outside firm given her job assignment, i.e., W E(V,n) = V LθE(n) and
W L(V,n) = V LθL(n). The wage difference between the CEO and the laborers is
∆W =W E(V,n)−W L(V,n), which increases in the total number of workers in the la-
borer level n.
Proposition 5 says that the old workers’ wages are equal to their expected produc-
tivities at an outside firm, which are determined by their expected abilities as well as
the production efficiency. Note that the wage paid to a tournament winner is evaluated
at the laborer level. This is because firms are slot constrained at the upper level. In
addition, due to the firm-specific human capital, an “insider” is more productive than an
“outsider”. Thus, firms do not replace an incumbent with an outside worker. Therefore,
firms can only offer a wage that is consistent with assigning an outside worker to the
lower level job.
Consider how the wage inequality, ∆W =V L[θE(n)−θL(n)], changes with the total
number of young workers hired into the laborer positions in period 1. When the pool of
young workers (i.e. contestants) becomes larger, the winner’s expected ability rises be-
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cause the winner of a larger contest signals more strongly about her ability. On the other
hand, the loser’s expected ability also rises since not being the best among n laborers is
a less bad outcome if n is larger.
To better illustrate this point, let us compare a two-person contest versus an n-person
contest. Ex ante, the two groups of workers have the same expected ability. Ex post,
since the expected ability of the winner from the two-person contest is above average,
the loser’s expected ability should be below average. That is, the “penalty” on losers’
expected ability is fully absorbed by this one “loser”. On the other hand, although the
expected ability of the winner from the n-person contest is larger than that from the two-
person contest, the penalty on losers’ expected ability is averaged across many losers.
The more the workers are in the promotion contest, the lower the penalty is on each
losers’ expected ability, and the closer the losers’ expected ability is to the unconditional
mean ability. In the extreme, when the size of the contestants’ pool approaches infinity,
the non-promoted workers’ expected ability approaches the unconditional mean. There-
fore, the expected ability of the losers from a larger contest is larger than the expected
ability of the losers from a smaller contest.6 When workers’ ability is uniformly dis-
tributed, the expected ability for a tournament winner grows faster than the expected
ability for a tournament loser as the size of the contestants’ pool increases. To see this,
note that θE(n)−θL(n) = θH−θL2 · 11+1/n . Thus, the wage gap between the winner and
the losers widens monotonically with the size of the contestants’ pool, i.e., ∂W/∂n > 0.
Now, let us consider how firms choose the optimal number of young laborers to hire
in period 1. Let n denote the number of young laborers. W LY denote the first period’s
6Waldman (2013) makes a similar argument and he illustrates this argument by considering a binomial
case where workers are either good or bad. See footnote 19 in Waldman (2013).
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wage for young laborers, which is a function of n. The firms’ problem is the following.
Max
n
nV LE(θ)−nW LY (n)+ [SV EθE(n)−W E(V,n)] (3.1)
+(n−1)[SV LθL(n)−W L(V,n)]
s.t. W LY (n)+ [
1
nW
E(V,n)+ n−1n W
L(V,n)]≥ U¯1+U¯2, (3.2)
(3.2) is workers’ participation constraint that a worker is better off choosing working
for a firm for two periods than staying self-employed for two periods. That is, the overall
lifetime income should be at least the amount of what the self-employment pays. In
equilibrium, the participation constraint binds. The first-order condition to the above
problem is
S(V E −V L)θH−θL
(n+1)2
= (U¯1+U¯2)− (1+S)V LE(θ). (3.3)
From (3.3), if we hold the production efficiency at the laborer level (V L) constant
but increase the production efficiency at the CEO level (V E), the total number of young
workers hired increases. The intuition is that as the CEO job becomes more efficient,
firms can extract more rents from the CEO worker if this worker is more able. Firms
achieve this sorting by increasing the contestants’ pool. I summarize this property in
Proposition 6.
Proposition 6. The total number of young workers hired in period 1 increases with V E ,
holding V L constant.
From Proposition 6, a firm with a more efficient production technology at the CEO
level hires more young workers and the market expectation about the CEO’s ability
increases with the number of young workers competing in the promotion tournament.
Thus, if the CEO job becomes more efficient, the firm grows holding the firm struc-
ture constant. As shown in Proposition 5 , when firms grow, wages at all levels go up
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and the wage distribution becomes more unequal. I summarize these relationships in
Proposition 7.
Proposition 7. Consider two firms with two layers. Suppose V E1 > V
E
2 ,V
L
1 = V
L
2 , then
n1 > n2,W
j
1 >W
j
2 , j ∈ {E,L}, and ∆W1 > ∆W2.
The wage patterns described in Proposition 7 are driven by the difference in the
production technology. The two-period model shows that firms will adjust their sizes
in response to technology changes while firm structure is held constant. That is, firms
with more efficient production technology at the CEO level are larger. However, Rajan
and Wulf (2006) find that firm sizes are relatively stable over time in their dataset al-
though there has been substantial technology advancements during their sample period.
This suggests that firms adjust to technology changes through changes in firm structure
while holding firm size constant. Before I discuss how firms’ structure changes with
technology, let me first consider a three-layer model in the following section.
3.4.2 A three-layer model
In a three-layer firm, the CEO (E) occupies the top level, managers (M) stay on the mid-
dle management level, and laborers (L) take up the lower level. Each manager heads a
division with a team of laborers. All managers report directly to the CEO. The produc-
tion efficiency at each job level is denoted by Vˆ j, j ∈ {E,M,L}. Similar to the two layer
case, an upper level job is more efficient in utilizing workers’ ability than a lower level
job, i.e., Vˆ E > Vˆ M > Vˆ L. The production function is the same as before. An individual
with ability θ who is assigned to job j produces SVˆ jθ units of output if she is old and
works for her incumbent firm; Vˆ jθ otherwise.
Firms live for two periods. In period 1, mˆ young workers are hired into the manage-
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ment positions in each firm and nˆ young workers are hired into the laborer positions in
each management division, i.e., mˆ · (nˆ+1) young workers are hired in each firm in pe-
riod 1. In period 2, when the workers are old, one of the managers will be chosen to fill
the CEO position. After the tournament at the management level, the laborers in the pro-
moted manager’s division compete for the management vacancy. I assume that the CEO
job requires some manager-specific human capital that only those who have worked as
a manager can work as a CEO. I also assume that there is some division-specific human
capital that only the laborers in a particular division can work as the manager in that
division.7
The firm’s problem at the management level in the three-layer model is very sim-
ilar to the one in the two-layer model. In period 2, after observing a manager’s job
assignment decisions made by her incumbent firm, outside firms form expectations
about the manager’s ability. I assume that the management production efficiency is
not very different from the laborer production efficiency so that there are no demo-
tions.8 Thus, a manager is either promoted to be the CEO or remains on the man-
agement level. Denote the expected ability of the promoted manager (i.e., the CEO)
θEP (mˆ) and the expected ability of a non-promoted manager θMN (mˆ). Then θEP (mˆ) =
E(θi|i is the best among mˆ managers) and θMN (mˆ) = E(θi|i is not the best among mˆ
managers).
At the laborer level, only one laborer in the division with a management va-
cancy will be promoted to become a manager. Outside firms only observe work-
7This assumption rules out cross-division promotions. Otherwise there are more laborers competing
for a single management position than managers competing for the CEO position such that the wage of
the winning laborer exceeds the wage of the CEO, which is counterfactual. See Friebel and Raith (2013)
for a theoretical analysis where cross-division promotions are allowed.
8It is possible that firms would want to demote a manager and replace her with a more competent
laborer after their true abilities are revealed. However, in doing so, the incumbent firm would send a strong
signal to the market about the laborer’s ability such that the productivity gain could not compensate for
the increase in the wage bill. Thus, if the manager-level production efficiency is not sufficiently different
from the laborer-level production efficiency, demotions will not occur.
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ers’ job assignments but they do not observe in which division a management va-
cancy becomes available. Since all firms are identical, firms know the number
of equilibrium young managers that other firms hire. Thus, if a laborer is pro-
moted to be a manager, the expected ability of the promoted laborer is 1mˆθ
M
P (nˆ) =
1
mˆE(θi|i is the best among nˆ laborers ). The expected ability of the non-promoted la-
borer is 1mˆθ
L
N(nˆ) + (1 − 1mˆ)E(θ) = 1mˆE(θi|i is not the best among nˆ laborers) + (1 −
1
mˆ)E(θ).
Now let us consider the second-period wages in a three-layer model. Wˆ EP (Vˆ , mˆ) is
the wage for a CEO who is promoted from a management position. Wˆ MN (Vˆ , mˆ) is the
wage for a manager who is not promoted to be a CEO from a management position.
Wˆ MP (Vˆ , mˆ, nˆ) is the wage for a manager who is just promoted to be a manger from a
laborer position. Wˆ LN (Vˆ , mˆ, nˆ) is the wage for a laborer who is not promoted to be a
manger from a laborer position. Proposition 8 describes the wages for the old workers
in three-layer firms.
Proposition 8. In equilibrium, an old worker’s wage is equal to her expected pro-
ductivity at an outside firm given her job assignment. At the management level, a
promoted manager’s wage is Wˆ EP (Vˆ , mˆ) = Vˆ
LθEP (mˆ) and a non-promoted manager’s
wage is Wˆ MN (Vˆ , mˆ) = Vˆ
LθMN (mˆ). At the laborer level, a promoted laborer’s wage
is Wˆ MP (Vˆ , mˆ, nˆ) = Vˆ
L[ 1mˆθ
M
P (nˆ)]; a non-promoted laborer’s wage is Wˆ
L
N (Vˆ , mˆ, nˆ) =
Vˆ L[ 1mˆθ
L
N(nˆ)+(1− 1mˆ)E(θ)].
I now consider the first-period problem in each firm. In period 1, at the management
level, firms choose a wage for young managers and decide how many managers to hire
into the management position. Let mˆ denotes the number of young managers to hire.
Wˆ MY denote the first period’s wage for young managers, which is a function of mˆ. The
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problem at the management level is the following.
Max
mˆ
mˆVˆ ME(θ)− mˆWˆ MY (mˆ)+ [SVˆ EθEP (mˆ)−Wˆ EP (Vˆ , mˆ)] (3.4)
+(mˆ−1)[SVˆ MθMN (mˆ)−Wˆ MN (Vˆ , mˆ)]
s.t. Wˆ MY (mˆ)+ [
1
mˆWˆ
E
P (Vˆ , mˆ)+
mˆ−1
mˆ Wˆ
M
N (Vˆ , mˆ)]≥ U¯1+U¯2 (3.5)
(3.5) is a worker’s participation constraint. U¯1 +U¯2 is a worker’s expected lifetime
income if she stays self-employed. That is, the young managers’ wage is such that she
is indifferent between working or staying self-employed for two periods. The first-order
condition that characterizes the problem in (3.4) is
S(Vˆ E −Vˆ M) θH−θL
(mˆ+1)2
= (U¯1+U¯2)− (1+S)Vˆ ME(θ). (3.6)
Note that the total number of young managers to hire is independent of the number
of laborers and is determined only by the production efficiencies at the CEO level and
the management level.
The problem at the laborers’ level is similar to the problem at the management level.
The only difference is that there might be no vacancy in a laborer’s division. Let nˆ
denote the number of young laborers to hire. Wˆ LY (nˆ) denotes the first period’s wage for
young laborers. The problem at the laborer level is the following.
Max
nˆ
nˆVˆ LE(θ)− nˆWˆ LY (nˆ)+(1−
1
mˆ
)[nˆSVˆ LE(θ)− nˆWˆ LN (Vˆ , mˆ, nˆ)] (3.7)
+
1
mˆ
{[SVˆθMP (nˆ)−Wˆ MP (Vˆ , mˆ, nˆ)]+(nˆ−1)[SVˆ LθLN(nˆ)−Wˆ LN (Vˆ , mˆ, nˆ)]}
s.t. Wˆ LY (nˆ)+(1−
1
mˆ
)Wˆ LN (Vˆ , mˆ, nˆ)
+
1
mˆ
[
1
nˆ
Wˆ MP (Vˆ , mˆ, nˆ)+
nˆ−1
nˆ
Wˆ LN (Vˆ , mˆ, nˆ)]≥ U¯1+U¯2 (3.8)
Similar to the manager’s problem, (3.8) is a worker’s participation constraint. The
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first-order condition that characterizes the problem in (3.7) is
1
mˆ
S(Vˆ M−Vˆ L)θH−θL
(nˆ+1)2
= (U¯1+U¯2)− (1+S)Vˆ LE(θ). (3.9)
From (3.9), the more young managers there are, the fewer young laborers there are
in each division. The intuition is that if there are many managers, the probability that a
vacancy occurs is low. Thus, it is less likely that a firm can extract the rent by placing a
more able worker into the management position. As a result, firms hire fewer laborers.
Compare the period-1’s problem at the management level and at the laborer level. If
the difference in terms of production efficiency between the CEO job and the manager
job is larger than the difference between the manager job and the laborer job, the CEO
would have a larger span-of-control than the managers. That is,
Proposition 9. If Vˆ E −Vˆ M > Vˆ M−Vˆ L, then mˆ > nˆ.
Proposition 9 says that upper-level managers have a larger span than lower-level
managers. This is due to the mechanism that firms have the incentive to assign more
able workers to more efficient jobs and the sorting is achieved through increasing the
number of contestant in a promotion tournament.
3.4.3 Technology, delayering, and wages
Now, we are ready to analyze the relationship between delayering and wages. Let us
first look at the relationship between technology changes, firm sizes, and firm structure.
We know from the delayering literature that one of the main causes of firm delayering is
technology advancement. Thus, I consider an exogenous technology shock that changes
the production efficiency at the CEO level in a three-layer firm from Vˆ E to V E and the
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firm decides to restructure into a two-layer firm. Since Rajan and Wulf (2006) find that
firms’ sizes are relatively stable over the years, I assume that the firm now hires the same
number of workers as before, i.e., N = Nˆ. I have the following Proposition.
Proposition 10. If firm size and the production efficiency at the laborer level are un-
changed, the CEO’s production efficiency must be higher after delayering, i.e. if
Nˆ = N,Vˆ L =V L, then it must be that V E > Vˆ E .
The logic behind Proposition 10 is the following. If a firm only has two layers,
all workers are led by the CEO. If a firm has three layers, the CEO only leads the
managers. If the firm has the same number of workers after delayering, it must be that
the CEO in the two-layer firm leads a larger production team, which means she is more
efficient. Note that Proposition 10 considers within firm changes rather than a cross firm
comparison.
Now, let us consider delayering and wage changes. If we compare the non-promoted
laborers’ wage, Wˆ LN , in the three-layer model to that in the two-layer model, W
L, we
can see that the laborers’ wage is higher in a two-layer firm, holding firm size and the
production efficiency at the laborer level constant. The reason is that the two-layer firm
has a larger contestant pool such that the expected ability of a loser is higher than the
expected ability of a loser in a smaller contest. Since the production efficiency at the
laborer level is unchanged, the flatter firm pays a higher non-promotion wage to the
laborers. Similar argument applies to the wages paid to the CEOs in the two-layer firm
and the three-layer firm. That is, after delayering, the CEO and the laborers are paid
more because of an upward adjustment in their expected abilities.
With regard to the wage difference between the CEO and the laborer, when the
market expectation about the non-promoted laborers’ ability increases, the market ex-
pectation about the CEO’s ability also increases. With a uniform ability distribution, the
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difference between these two expectations becomes larger as the number of contestants
gets larger. That is, after delayering, the wage distribution within a firm becomes more
unequal. I summarize the above argument in Proposition 11.
Proposition 11. Suppose there is a technology change that results in a higher CEO
production efficiency, i.e., V E > Vˆ E , and delayering. If firm size and the production
efficiency at the laborer level are unchanged, both the laborers and the CEO’s wages
increase, i.e., if Nˆ = N,Vˆ L = V L, then W E > Wˆ EP ,W
L > Wˆ LN . In addition, ∆W =W E −
W L > ∆Wˆ = Wˆ EP −Wˆ LN
The predictions in Proposition 11 capture the empirical findings in the delayering lit-
erature that when firms become flatter, wages at all level go up (Bauer and Bender, 2001;
Rajan and Wulf, 2006; Caliendo et al., 2012) and wage inequality increases (Bauer and
Bender, 2001).
In Zabojnik and Bernhardt (2001), more efficient firms are larger given that all firms
have the same number of layers. From Proposition 10, a more efficient firm (measured
by the production efficiency at the CEO level) is not necessarily larger than a less-
efficient firm if we take into account firm restructuring. This result is consistent with the
empirical finding in Rajan and Wulf (2006) that firms have fewer layers without much
changes in firm size over time.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper develops a model with asymmetric learning and slot constraints to explore
the relationship between firm delayering and workers’ wages. It contributes to the liter-
ature in multiple ways. First, it contributes to the delayering literature by exploring the
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consequences of delayering on wages while most of the delayering literature focuses on
the causes of the delayering trend. Second, it contributes to the job assignment literature
by considering how firms’ organization structure affects wages. Third, this model cap-
tures several empirical findings that are not well explained in the existing literature. My
model shows that after delayering, workers’ wages at all levels increase because they
are now participating in a larger contest and thus their expected abilities are higher. In
addition, since the workers’ wage at the top increases faster than the wage increase at
the bottom, the wage distribution becomes more unequal after delayering.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 1
Derivation of the parameter restriction in equation (1.3).
Let us consider the four possible equilibrium career development paths (all other paths
are strictly dominated as explained in the text) for a type- j worker and her total produc-
tivity in all three periods associated with each of the four career paths. Since in each
path, the productivity in period 1 is the same, we simply consider the total productivity
in period 2 and 3. Since there is free entry, firms make zero profit by paying out all the
expected output as wages. Thus, firms’ problem is to maximize expected productivity
by assigning workers optimally. Π j,2,2 denote the total productivity (in period 2 and 3)
of a type- j worker who starts in job j, is promoted to level 2 in period 2, and stays on
level 2 in period 3. Π j, j,2 denote the total productivity of a type- j worker who starts in
job j, stays in job j in period 2, and is promoted to level 2 in period 3. This is the pro-
ductivity of the non-movers. Π j,k,2 denote the total productivity of a type- j worker who
starts in job j, is laterally moved to job k in period 2, and is promoted to level 2 in period
3. This is the productivity of the movers. Finally, Π j, j, j denote the total productivity of
a type- j worker who starts in job j and stays in job j for all three periods. We have the
following expressions.
Π j,2,2(θ) = {d2+ c2θ [ f (γ(1+α)+ s)+ f (s)]}+{d2+ c2θ [ f (1+ γ(1+α)+ s)+ f (1+ s)]}
(A.1)
Π j, j,2(θ) = {d1+ c1θ f (1+α+ s)}+{d2+ c2θ [ f (γ(2+α)+ s)+ f (s)]} (A.2)
Π j,k,2(θ) = {d1+ c1θ f (s)}+{d2+ c2θ [ f (γ(1+α)+ s)+ f (γ+ s)]} (A.3)
Π j, j, j(θ) = {d1+ c1θ f (1+α+ s)}+{d1+ c1θ f (2+α+ s)} (A.4)
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We can see that for any positive θ , either Π j, j,2 >Π j,k,2 or Π j,k,2 >Π j, j,2 . Parameters
in (1.3) guarantees that the latter inequality holds that lateral moves exist in equilibrium.
‖
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Equating (A.1) and (A.3) gives the cut off ability to promote a worker or not in period
2. Let θ ∗ satisfy Π j,2,2(θ ∗) =Π j,k,2(θ ∗). Solve for θ ∗, we get
θ ∗ =
d1−d2
c2[ f (1+ γ(1+α)+ s)+ f (1+ s)+ f (s)− f (γ+ s)]− c1 f (s) .
For θi > θ ∗, Π j,2,2 > Π j,k,2. Thus, it is optimal to promote a worker in period 2. Sim-
ilarly, equating (A.3) and (A.4) gives the cut off ability to lateral move a worker or not
in period 2. Let θ˜ ∗ satisfy Π j,k,2(θ˜ ∗) =Π j, j, j(θ˜ ∗). Solve for θ˜ ∗, we get
θ˜ ∗ =
d1−d2
c2[ f (γ(1+α)+ s)+ f (γ+ s)]− c1[ f (2+α+ s)+ f (1+α+ s)− f (s)] .
For θi > θ˜ ∗, Π j,k,2 >Π j, j, j. Thus, it is optimal to move a worker in period 2 and promote
her in period 3. ‖
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
In period 3, firms problem is to maximize the last period productivity given workers’
job assignment history. There are two types of workers with different career paths that
are considered promotion. Let θ jk3 and θ
j j
3 denote, respectively, the cutoff ability levels
for promotions in period 3 for a period-2 mover and a period-2 non-mover (a non-mover
is not promoted or moved). θ jk3 solves d1+c1θ
jk
3 f (1+α+ s) = d2+c2θ
jk
3 [ f (γ+ γα+
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s)+ f (γ+1+ s)], which says θ jk3 is such that firms are indifferent between promoting a
period-2 mover or let her move back to her matched job. For θ ei3 > θ
jk
3 , a period-2 mover
is more productive if promoted to level 2. Otherwise, she is more productive in her
matched job. θ jk3 =(d1−d2)/{c2[ f (s+γ+γα)+ f (s+γ)]−c1 f (1+α+s)}. Similarly,
θ j j3 solves d1+ c1θ
j j
3 f (2+α+ s) = d2+ c2θ
j j
3 [ f (2γ+ γα+ s)+ f (s)], which says θ
j j
3
is such that firms are indifferent between promoting a period-2 non-mover or make her
stay in her matched job. θ j j3 = (d1−d2)/{c2[ f (s+2γ+ γα)+ f (s)]−c1 f (2+α+ s)}.
We can see that, θ j j3 > θ
jk
3 . This proves (iv). Let θ
j2
3 denote the cutoff ability level for a
period-2 promoted worker to stay on level 2 in period 3. θ j23 solves d1+c1θ
j2
3 f (1+α+
s) = d2+c2θ
j2
3 [ f (1+ γ+ γα+ s)+ f (1+ s)], θ
j2
3 = (d1−d2)/{c2[ f (1+ s+ γ+ γα)+
f (1+ s)]− c1 f (1+α+ s)}. If θ ei3 > θ j22 , the worker remains on level 2, otherwise she
is demoted into her matched job on level 1. This proves (i)
In period 2, θ j2 denotes the cutoff ability level for promotion, which solves
{d1+ c1θ j2 f (s)}+ prob.(θ ei3 ≥ θ jki3 |θ ei2 = θ j2 ){d2+ c2θ j2 [ f (s+ γ+ γα)+ f (γ+ s)]}
+ prob.(θ ei3 < θ
jk
i3 |θ ei2 = θ j2 ){d1+ c1θ j2 f (1+α+ s)}
= {d2+ c2θ j2 [ f (s+ γ+ γα)+ f (s)]}+ prob.(θ ei3 ≥ θ j23 |θ ei2 = θ j2 ){d2+ c2θ j2 [ f (1+ s+ γ+ γα)
+ f (1+ s)]}+ prob.(θ ei3 < θ j23 |θ ei2 = θ j2 ){d1+ c1θ j2 f (1+ s+α)}.
That is, θ j2 is such that firms are indifferent between laterally moving a worker or pro-
moting her in period 2. For θ ei2 > θ
j
2 , it is more productive to promote a worker. This
proves (ii). (iii) is straightforward from the parameterization. ‖
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A.3 Proof of Corollary 1
X = prob.(θ ei3 > θ
jk
3 |θ˜ j2 < θ ei2≤ θ j2 ) denote the probability that a laterally moved worker
is promoted in period 3 from period 2’s perspective. Y = prob.(θ ei3 > θ
j j
3 |θ ei2 < θ˜ j2 ) is
the probability that a non-mover is promoted in period 3. At the beginning of period 1,
P1 := prob.(θ = θH) = p0. zi1 = θi f (s+α)+ εi j1 = (yi j1−d1)/c1. Define
P2 := prob.(θ = θH |zi1) = p0h[zi1−θH f (s+α)]p0h[zi1−θH f (s+α)]+(1− p0)h[zi1−θL f (s+α)]
=
p0
p0+(1− p0) h[zi1−θL f (s+α)]h[zi1−θH f (s+α)]
, where h(·) is the density of the error term. Then, given P2, zi2 is such that
P3 := prob.(θ = θH |zi1,zi2) = P2h[zi2−θH f (s)]P2h[zi2−θH f (s)]+(1−P2)h[zi2−θL f (s)]
=
P2
P2+(1−P2) h[zi2−θL f (s)]h[zi2−θH f (s)]
.
Since h[zi1−θL f (·)]h[zi1−θH f (·)] decreases in zi2, P3 increases in zi2, there exists a cutoff probability
Plat∗3 such that when P3 > P
lat∗
3 , a period-2 mover is promoted in period 3. P
lat∗
3 satisfies
Plat∗3 θH +(1−Plat∗3 )θL = θ jk3 , i.e., Plat∗3 = (θ jk3 −θL)/(θH−θL). That is, given P2, there
exists a zlat∗3 (P2) such that if zi2 > z
lat∗
3 (P2), a period-2 mover is promoted in period 3.
Similary, there exists a cutoff probability Pstay∗3 such that when P3 > P
stay∗
3 , a period-2
non-mover is promoted in period 3. Pstay∗3 satisfies P
stay∗
3 θH +(1−Pstay∗3 )θL = θ j j3 , i.e.,
Pstay∗3 =(θ
j j
3 −θL)/(θH−θL). Then, there exisits a zstay∗3 (P2) such that if zi2 > zstay∗3 (P2),
a period-2 non-mover is promoted in period 3. As shown in Proposition 2 (iv), θ jk3 < θ
j j
3 ,
thus Plat∗3 < P
stay∗
3 .
Furthermore, prob.(zi2 ≥ z(p)),∀z(p), increases in p, since lateral move means a
more positive P2 and the promotion cutoff for a period-2 mover is lower, the probability
of promoting a mover is higher. ‖
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A.4 Proof of Corollary 2
Consider the wage changes from period 2 to period 3 after the lateral move. Let wLt
denote the wage in t for a period-2 mover. wSt denote the wage in t for a period-2
non-mover. θ ei1 = θ0,∀i;θ ei2 = E(θ |zi1),θ ei3 = E(θ |zi1,zi2), i ∈ {S,L}. In period 2, the
expected wage change from period 2 to period 3 for a mover (L) is
∆wL := E(wL3−wL2|P1,P2) = c1θ eL2[ f (1+α+ s)− f (s)]
+ E[g(θ eL3)|P1,P2]{c2[ f (γ+ γα+ s)+ f (γ+ s)]
− c1 f (1+α+ s)},
where g(θ eL3) = max{0,θ eL3−θ jk3 }. The expected wage change from period 2 to period
3 for a non-mover (S) is
∆wS := E(wS3−wS2|P1,P2) = c1θ eS2[ f (2+α+ s)− f (1+α+ s)]
+ E[g(θ eS3)|P1,P2]{c2[ f (2γ+ γα+ s)+ f (s)]
− c1 f (2+α+ s)}
, where g(θ eS3) = max{0,θ eS3− θ j j3 }. Since ∀θ ∗, prob.(θ ei3 ≥ θ ∗|P1,P2) increases in P2
and θ jk3 < θ
j j
3 , we have E[g(θ
e
L3)|P1,P2]>E[g(θ eS3)|P1,P2]. Using the concavity of f (·)
and the fact that θ eL2 > θ
e
S2, we have ∆w
L > ∆wS.
Now let’s consider briefly the wage changes from period 1 to period 2 in the period
of lateral move. In period 1, the expected wage change from period 1 to period 2 for a
mover is E(wL2−wL1|P1) = c1[θ eL2 f (s)−θ0 f (s+α)]; the expected wage change from
period 1 to period 2 for a non-mover is E(wS2−wS1|P1) = c1[θ eS2 f (1+s+α)−θ0 f (s+
α)]. Since θ eL2 > θ
e
S2, the wage relation is ambiguous. ‖
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Table A.1: Lateral Moves by Years and Reporting Level
Lateral Move (t)
Level (t) t = 1982 t = 1983 t = 1984
Freq. Pct. Freq. Pct. Freq. Pct.
1 4 2.0% 8 3.3% 5 2.0%
2 101 10.2% 123 10.0% 114 9.1%
3 262 9.7% 406 11.9% 360 10.2%
4 439 12.1% 706 14.8% 693 14.1%
5 308 12.1% 482 13.6% 498 14.3%
6 115 10.6% 194 12.5% 231 15.8%
7 28 7.3% 53 10.2% 77 15.7%
8 5 4.8% 10 6.1% 3 1.9%
9 0 0.0% 3 4.8% 0 0.0%
10 0 0.0% 1 4.6% 0 0.0%
11 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Total 1,262 10.8% 1,986 12.8% 1,981 12.7%
A.5 Robustness Checks
In the main analysis, I use past-period’s total pay as a proxy for individuals’ expected
productivity. In Table ??, I present the results replicating Columns (3) and (6) in Table
1.5. The effect of lateral moves on promotions is robust to different measures of ex-
pected productivity. In particular, two years after the move, the movers are more likely
to earn a promotion.
In Table A.3, I present the results replicating Columns (3) and (6) in Table 1.5 clus-
tering the standard errors by individual and by firm using Bootstrap. The lateral-more-
promotion relation persists.
In Table A.4, I present the results replicating Table 1.6 by clustering the standard
errors at the firm level. The lateral-move-wage relation persists.
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2
Expression for Parameterization (ii)
(1+S){E[ymiT |qiT (1)]−E[yliT |qiT (1)]}> E[ymiT |qiT (1)]−E[yliT |qiT (0)].
This condition guarantees that a worker is promoted when a high productive effi-
ciency is attained because the productivity gain from correct job assignment is larger
than the loss in terms of paying a higher wage by sending the promotion signal to the
market.
B.1 Proof of Proposition 3
In period T, the incumbent’s and the outside firm’s problem is to maximize the expected
productivity in period T. Thus, a good worker is assigned to the upper-level job. In
period T-1, in anticipating that a good worker is assigned to the upper-level job, the
incumbent and the outside firms also maximize the expected productivity in period T-1
and assign a good worker to the upper-level job. By induction, a good worker is always
assigned to the upper-level job. ‖
B.2 Proof of Proposition 4
Since the incumbent’s assignment decision is made by maximizing the current period
productivity, given parameter restriction (i), all young workers are assigned to the lower
114
level job. Now, observe that qt(0) < qt−1(0) < .. . < q2(0), given parameter restriction
(ii), if a worker continues to produce low, the expectation that she is good is below q∗.
Therefore, a worker who produce low remains on level-l. Also, since the belief that a
worker is good only depends on the total number of high productive efficiency that has
been achieved up to a certain period, in period T , no matter when a worker attains a
high output, the belief that she is good is the same. In addition, a worker with only one
high output up to T − 1 is less likely to be a good worker compared to workers with
more high outputs. Thus, if a worker with only one high output in the previous T − 1
periods is more productive on the upper level in expectation, all other types should be
more productive on the upper level. Therefore, q∗ < qT (1) < qT (2) < .. . < qT (T −1)
guarantees that once a worker attains high output, she is always more productive on the
upper-level job. Parameter restriction (iii) guarantees that an incumbent firm gain more
through correct job assignment and to assign a worker with at least one high output in
the previous T −1 periods to the upper level job. ‖
B.3 Proof of Corollary 3
From Proposition 4,
wlt [qt(0)] = {qt(0)E lg+[1−qt(0)]E lr + f (t−1)}
+βS{[qt(0)θg+(1−qt(0))θr][qt+1(1)Emg +(1−qt+1(1))Emr ]
+ [qt(0)(1−θg)+(1−qt(0))(1−θr)][qt+1(0)E lg+(1−qt+1(0))E lr]+ f (t)}
So wlt [qt(0)]−wlt+1[qt+1(0)]
= [qt(0)−qt+1(0)][E lg−E lr]− [ f (t)− f (t−1)]
+βS{Et [ZJt+1t+1 |qt(0), l]−Et+1[ZJt+2t+2 |qt+1(0), l]− [ f (t+1)− f (t)]}.
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From Bayes’ Rule, qt(0) =
p0(1−θg)t−1
p0(1−θg)t−1+(1−p0)(1−θr)t−1 . Thus,
∆qt(0) = qt(0)−qt+1(0) = 1
1+ 1−p0p0
(
1−θr
1−θg
)t−1 − 1
1+ 1−p0p0
(
1−θr
1−θg
)t ,
which decreases in t. Therefore, q2(0)− q3(0) > qt(0)− qt+1(0). Similarly qt(1)−
qt−1(1) > qt+1(1)− qt(1),qt+1(1)− qt(1) > qt+1(0)− qt(0). Since f (t)− f (t− 1) >
f (t∗1)− f (t∗1−1)> f (t∗1 +1)− f (t∗1)> [q2(1)−q3(1)][E lg−E lr]> [qt(1)−qt+1(1)][E lg−
E lr]> [qt(0)−qt+1(0)][E lg−E lr] for t < t∗1 +1, wlt <wlt+1. Since f (t+1)− f (t)< f (t∗1 +
2)− f (t∗1 +1)< [qt¯(1)−qt¯+1(1)][E lg−E lr]< [qt(1)−qt+1(1)][E lg−E lr] for t∗1 +1< t ≤ t¯
and f (t+1)− f (t)→ 0 for t ≥ t¯, wlt > wlt+1. ‖
B.4 Proof of Corollary 4
For a promoted worker who attains H in t, in expectation, this worker can produce H or
L in the next time but her expected productivity is fixed at the time t when she attains
H. Thus,
wmt [qt(1)] = {qt(1)Emg +[1−qt(1)]Emr + f (t−1)}
+β{(1+S)[qt(1)θg+(1−qt(1))θr][qt+1(2)Emg +(1−qt+1(2))Emr ]
+ (1+S)[qt(1)(1−θg)+(1−qt(1))(1−θr)][qt+1(1)Emg +(1−qt+1(1))Emr ]
−{qt(1)Emg +[1−qt(1)]Emr }+S f (t)}
So wmt [qt(1)]−wmt+1[qt+1(1)]
= (1−β )[qt(1)−qt+1(1)][Emg −Emr ]− [ f (t)− f (t−1)]
+β{(1+S)
[
Et [Z
Jt+1
t+1 |qt(1),m]−Et+1[ZJt+2t+2 |qt+1(1),m]
]
−S[ f (t+1)− f (t)]}.
Similar to the proof for Corollary 4, ∆qt+1(2) > ∆qt+2(2) for t ≥ 3. Using similar
argument, since f (t)− f (t−1)> f (t∗2)− f ( f ∗2 −1)> f (t∗2 +1)− f ( f ∗2 )> 1+SS [q4(2)−
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q5(2)][E lg−E lr]> 1+SS [qt(2)−qt+1(2)][E lg−E lr]> (1−β )[qt(1)−qt+1(1)][Emg −Emr ] for
3≤ t < t∗2 +1, wmt+1[qt+1(1)]>wmt [qt(1)]; since f (t+1)− f (t)< f (t∗2 +2)− f (t∗2 +1)<
(1− β )[qt¯(2)− qt¯+1(2)][E lg − E lr] < 1+SS [qt¯(2)− qt¯+1(2)][E lg − E lr] for t > t∗2 + 1 and
f (t+1)− f (t)→ 0 for t ≥ t¯, wmt+1[qt+1(1)]< wmt [qt(1)]. ‖
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APPENDIX C
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3
C.1 Proof of Proposition 5 and 8
Consider a production unit with production efficiency V employing n young workers. In
period 2, outside firms form expectations about old workers’ ability denoted as θ e. Due
to the existence of the exogenous movers, the market expectation is free of the winner’s
curse. Since there are multiple firms, the standard result is that the market value of
the worker is at her expected productivity, which equals to Vθ e. Since the worker can
produce more at her incumbent firm, her first-period employer has an incentive to match
her market value.‖
C.2 Proof of Proposition 6
From (3.3) , since the RHS is unchanged, when V E goes up, n goes up. ‖
C.3 Proof of Proposition 7
From Proposition 6, since V E1 > V
E
2 ,V
L
1 = V
L
2 , then n1 > n2. Since {θi}, i ∈
1, . . . ,n, follows uniform distribution, f (θ) = 1/(θH − θL),F(θ) = (θ − θL)/(θH −
θL). Prob.(θi is the largest among n)=Fn(θ). Thus, E(θi|θi is the largest among n) =∫ θH
θL θ · n f (θ)Fn−1(θ)dθ = (nθH + θL)/(n + 1), which increases in n. Since n1 >
n2, E(θi|θi is the largest among n1) > E(θi|θi is the largest among n2). Thus,
W E1 > W
E
2 . From the law of total expectation, E(θ) = E(θ |θ is not the largest
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among n)·P(θ is not the largest among n)+E(θ |θ is the largest among n)·P(θ is
the largest among n),(θH + θL)/2 = E(θ |θ not largest)(1− 1/n) + (nθH + θL)/(n+
1)(1/n).E(θ |θ not the largest) = [n(θH + θL) + 2θL]/[2(n+ 1)], which also increases
in n. Thus, the laborers’ wage also increases, i.e., W L1 > W
L
2 . As for the wage dif-
ference, ∆W = (V E −V L)θE(n)+V L[θE(n)−θL(n)]. We know θE(n) increases in n.
θE(n)−θL(n) = θH−θL2 · nn+1 , which also increases in n. Thus ∆W1 > ∆W2. ‖
C.4 Proof of Proposition 9
Note that θE +(n− 1)θL = nE(θ). Thus, the maximization problem at the two-layer
firm can be re-write into
Max
n
nV LE(θ)+S(V E −V L)θE(n)+SV Ln nE(θ)−n(U¯1+U¯2).
I re-write as follows the three first-order conditions that pin down the equilibrium num-
ber of young workers in the three-layer firm and the two-layer firm.
S(V E −V L) θH−θL
(N+1)2
= (U¯1+U¯2)− (1+S)V LE(θ) (C.1)
S(Vˆ E −Vˆ M) θH−θL
(mˆ+1)2
= (U¯1+U¯2)− (1+S)Vˆ ME(θ) (C.2)
1
mˆ
S(Vˆ M−Vˆ L)θH−θL
(nˆ+1)2
= (U¯1+U¯2)− (1+S)Vˆ LE(θ) (C.3)
From (C.3) over (C.2) , Vˆ
M−Vˆ L
Vˆ E−Vˆ M ·
(mˆ+1)2
mˆ(nˆ+1)2 =
(U¯1+U¯2)−(1+S)Vˆ LE(θ)
(U¯1+U¯2)−(1+S)Vˆ ME(θ) . Then the RHS>1.
Suppose nˆ > mˆ. Since Vˆ
M−Vˆ L
Vˆ E−Vˆ M < 1,
(mˆ+1)2
mˆ(nˆ+1)2 < 1, the LHS < 1. Contradiction. Thus,
nˆ < mˆ.‖
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C.5 Proof of Proposition 10
From (C.2),
S[(Vˆ E −Vˆ M) − (Vˆ M−Vˆ L)] θH−θL
(mˆ+1)2
(C.4)
= (U¯1+U¯2)− (1+S)Vˆ ME(θ)−S(Vˆ M−Vˆ L) θH−θL
(mˆ+1)2
.
From (C.1) over (C.5), we have
V E −V L
Vˆ E −Vˆ L
(mˆ+1)2
(N+1)2
=
(U¯1+U¯2)− (1+S)V LE(θ)
(U¯1+U¯2)− (1+S)Vˆ ME(θ)−S(Vˆ M−Vˆ L) θH−θL(mˆ+1)2
> 1.
Since (mˆ+1)
2
(N+1)2 < 1,
V E−V L
Vˆ E−Vˆ L > 1, i.e.,V
E > Vˆ E . The CEO position at the flatter firm is more
efficient. ‖
C.6 Proof of Proposition 11
W E = V LθE(N),W L = V LθL(N),Wˆ EP = Vˆ LθˆEP (mˆ),Wˆ LN = Vˆ L[
1
mˆ θˆ
L
N(nˆ)+ (1− 1mˆ)E(θ)].
From Proposition 10,V E > Vˆ E . From Proposition 7,θE(N) > θˆEP (mˆ). Let’s consider
A := θL(N) and B := 1mˆ θˆ
L
N(nˆ) + (1− 1mˆ)E(θ). We know N = Nˆ = mˆ(nˆ+ 1). Then
A := mˆ(nˆ+1)(θH+θL)+2θL2[mˆ(nˆ+1)+1] . B :=
mˆ(nˆ+1)(θH+θL)+2θL−(θH+θL)
2[mˆ(nˆ+1)+1]−2 . Since A <
θH+θL
2 , then A > B.
That is, the expected ability of a non-promoted laborer in a two-layer firm is higher
than the expected ability of a non-promoted laborer in a three-layer firm. Therefore, if
Nˆ = N,Vˆ L =V L, then W E > Wˆ EP ,W
L > Wˆ LN .
From the proof of Proposition 7, the difference in the two expectations
E(θ |θ is the largest in n)−E(θ |θ is not the largest in n) = θH−θL2 · nn+1 increases in n.
∆W =V L[θE(N)−θL(N)] =V L · θH−θL2 · NN+1 . ∆Wˆ = Vˆ L[θˆEP (mˆ)− 1mˆ θˆLN(nˆ)− mˆ−1mˆ θH+θL2 ].
Let C := θˆEP (mˆ)− 1mˆ θˆLN(nˆ)− mˆ−1mˆ θH+θL2 < mˆ
2−mˆ+1
mˆ(mˆ+1) · θH−θL2 = [1− 2mˆ−1mˆ(mˆ+1) ]θH−θL2 . Let
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D := NN+1 · θH−θL2 = mˆ(nˆ+1)mˆ(nˆ+1)+1 · θH−θL2 = [1− 1mˆ(nˆ+1)+1 ]θH−θL2 . We can see that D >C as
long as mˆ, nˆ > 1. Therefore, ∆W > ∆Wˆ . ‖
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